BORDERS IN GLOBALIZATION
From Asylum to Resettlement: 
International Organizations' Role in the 
Securitization of the 2015 "Refugee Crisis"

Amanda Bergman
From Asylum to Resettlement: 
International Organizations’ Role in the Securitization of the 2015 “Refugee Crisis”
Prepared by Amanda Bergmann for the Borders in Globalization Project

When we think of migration management, we tend to think of routes of immigration or temporary foreign worker policies, and not of refugees, asylum seekers, or protracted situations of internal displacement. This is because these latter bodies are an anomaly of our system, generated only by the breakdown of states who are unwilling or unable to care for their citizens. We respond to displacement, but in large part do not extensively plan ahead.

In 2015, the European Union faced a political crisis in the wake of an upsurge in asylum seeker arrivals and refugee claims. During the course of the year, close to 1.3 million asylum seekers - predominantly driven by instability and insecurity in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Albania - fled their homes and sought refuge within the European Union. Representing an increase of 693 thousand first-time applicants compared to 2014, this sudden influx of individuals overwhelmed patchwork European Union response mechanisms. Due to both a lack of political will and an inability to formulate a common response system internally, the European Union instituted policies and procedures that ‘outsource’ the asylum regime and its associated issues to surrounding states. In effect, the European Union is shifting from a regime of asylum towards one of refugee resettlement.

This paper focuses on the EU’s process of securitization of asylum, and subsequent shift from asylum to resettlement policies during the most recent period of increased asylum and refugee applications in 2015-2016 (controversially referred to as the ‘Refugee Crisis’). While much literature has been written about the externalization of European policies to hinder asylum seeker’s arrivals in various contexts, little attention has been paid to identifying the role of International Organizations (IOs) within this process. This paper largely finds that despite efforts for IOs to introduce or implement asylum-friendly policies, the security priorities of individual EU States and the need for IOS to maintain relevancy within the regime have relegated IOs to the role of service providers. As such, IOs can be said to not influence the development of the EU asylum/refugee regime during the period of 2015-2016 in any great manner past normalizing the securitization agenda of EU’s member states.

The Securitization of Asylum

1 Migration Management refers to the creation of global rules, norms, and regimes designed to order and control the phenomenon of human mobility. For a detailed description of this phenomenon, see: Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud, eds., The Politics of International Migration Management (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
Prior to the 20th century, legal concepts surrounding displacement did not even exist. A global tradition of liberalism, a booming world economy, and porous and unmonitored borders meant that while individuals were displaced from their homes for a variety of reasons, the international community saw no reason to afford those who were displaced specific judicial status. This changed, however, with the rise of the modern-day nation state, which defines itself through citizenship, belonging, and border control. In fact, in a globalized world where international treaties and agreements regulate much of international affairs, many scholars have indicated that immigration and border control are the last bastions of modern day sovereignty.

Refugees and asylum-seekers were thus codified into international law through the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees (Convention), a document which represents the starting point for globalized migration management in the displacement context. The Convention confirms who is recognized internationally as a refugee, what rights they are afforded, and the responsibilities of states in dealing with asylum and refugee populations, facilitating the classification and control of internationally displaced populations. Concurrent and following the Convention’s ratification, international organizations dedicated to displacement management – at right, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with others following – were created in whole or in part to help manage this new class of persons. While displacement has grown throughout the decades, not since the initial displacement in WWII which prompted the creation of the Convention has the world seen such high levels of displacement and massive South-North movement as is seen today. As such, international bodies, states, and international organizations (IOs) alike are once again re-defining migration management in the displacement context. However, instead of upholding the rights afforded refugees and asylum seekers by the Convention, or expanding state obligations in the wake of global state failure to respond effectively to mass displacement, the international focus is on how the displaced are challenging State security.

Despite their new legally differentiated status, until the 1980s asylum seekers and refugees alike were commonly perceived as migrants and therefore extra labour within expanding economies. This is largely attributable to the fact that asylum seeker and refugee flows were small and arrived from Eastern Europe. As such, in addition to being seen as culturally similar, they fit nicely into the political image of individuals fleeing communism and the Soviet bloc. This atmosphere allowed for the expansion of a relatively liberal refugee scheme. In spite of the conservative definition of a Convention refugee, European states continued to perceive and utilize the Convention as a guarantor of universal protection for all those who they believed oppressed and persecuted, and

---

protection was oftentimes extended to those who would have likely been otherwise excluded by the narrow definition. For example, Hungarians fleeing the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and Algerians fleeing the 1957 Algerian Civil War were initially considered unqualified to meet the Convention requirements, but subsequently considered to be Convention refugees thanks to a liberal effect-event understanding of Article 1(B)(b). These actions placated the initial objectors by showing how an expanded scope would be applied, and eventually paved the way for the ratification of the 1967 Protocol. This Protocol removed the geographic and temporal aspects, and effectively extended protection under the Convention to the liberal European understanding of all ‘new forms’ of refugees.

Yet these liberalized policies also exacerbated conditions which contributed to the securitization of asylum. The expansion of Convention-eligible refugees in 1967, combined with increasing activity by UNHCR operations in Africa, granted a large number of individuals—victims of decolonization, interethnic conflicts, and superpower rivalry—recognition and rights under the Convention. These new refugees were a great departure from what Europe had come to expect: the numbers were larger, the cultures more diverse, and chances of expedient repatriation low. Asylum seekers and refugees thus became perceived as a threat to the process of European identity consolidation.

---


9 Kazimierz Bem, “The Coming of a ‘Blank Cheque’ — Europe, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol” International Journal of Refugee Law 16, no. 4 (2004): 618-620. Prior to its expansion, the Convention limited its protective scope to those who were displaced before 1951; in essence, those impacted by WWII. Any individuals displaced by conflict after that deadline were not covered by Convention rights. However, Europeans were eager to bolster a liberal asylum system, and instead adopted an ‘effect-event’ understanding. This effectively meant that if a conflict’s root causes could be tied to pre-1951 events—such as the Hungarian Revolution of the Algerian Civil War—protection could be offered to the displaced persons of those conflicts. This understanding permitted Europeans to extend rights to those very populations in the late 1950s.


11 Bem, “The Coming of a Blank Cheque,” 627; Jackson, “The 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees: A Universal Basis for Protection,” 412. Note that signatory states to the Convention could, if concerned about this expansion, refuse to sign the Protocol and retain the territoriality and temporal limitations initially adopted.

12 It is interesting to note that while concessions were made for the Hungarians and the Algerians, no such concessions were made for those in China. Bem notes that despite China being represented by a Taiwanese official at the Convention drafting, neither this official nor other states were willing to extend the policy to potential Chinese/Taiwanese refugees fleeing Communist takeover. He attributes this to the high political cost of recognition: if refugees were recognized, it would delegitimize Taiwan’s sovereignty by extending China’s (lack of) state control to areas claimed by Taiwan; if they were not, it would be tantamount to recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign nation that could also offer safety. This same rationale was applied to British Hong Kong. (Bem, “The Coming of a Blank Cheque,” 622)


14 This was aggravated further by the fact that, at the time, the European Union began to heavily emphasize the idea of the ‘cosmopolitan European’ identity above national identity. This was
and became increasingly framed by welfare chauvinists as bogus claimants seeking to leach off of Europe’s generous social safety nets. Furthermore, an accompanied increase in human trafficking led many to draw parallels between irregularized migration (which includes asylum-seeking) and criminality, contributing to the ever-increasing phenomenon of securitization. Security concerns related to irregularized migration have since been exacerbated by real and imagined threats of terrorists posing as refugees in order to gain access to Europe and conduct terrorist attacks.

From Asylum to Securitized Resettlement

As a result of the securitization of asylum seekers and the failure of the EU to design and implement the Common European Asylum System, individual European Union states are now shifting from a model of ‘asylum’ towards one of ‘resettlement’. In an asylum model, asylum-seekers who have not yet gained Convention refugee status must cross internationally-recognized borders and file their claims for refugee recognition in their countries of arrival. Meanwhile, in a resettlement model, third-party states (almost exclusively in the West) sponsor already recognized Convention refugees for resettlement.

Australia has championed this shift in policy model thanks to agreements with neighbouring South Pacific states (the ‘Pacific Solution’). However, in the European context, this is best exemplified in the new Turkey-EU deal. Prior to the deal, Turkey acted as both a settlement and a transit state: individuals would both file for refugee status within Turkey, but also use Turkey as a transit route to the European Union where predicated on common culture and history – something that these new asylum seekers and refugees did not share.

15 Welfare chauvinism is the belief that national citizens should have priority access to the state’s resources. Asylum seekers therefore become illegitimate recipients of socio-economic rights. While right-wing parties across Europe were radically different in form, they shared a common ideology that criticized multicultural societies and promoted such chauvinism. (Carl Levy, “The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?” Government and Opposition 40 (2005): 40; Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” 767.)


17 For example, it was widely reported that the Paris attacks were conducted by refugees. While this was later disproven, public perception still commonly associated refugees and asylum-seekers with increased security fears. See: Ishaan Tharoor, “Were Syrian refugees involved in the Paris Attacks? What we know and don’t know,” Washington Post, 17 November 2015, last accessed 25 June 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/17/were-syrian-refugees-involved-in-the-paris-attacks-what-we-know-and-dont-know/.

18 The Australian model of externalization is more advanced than the European model, and is comprised of two parts. Firstly, Australia has made it illegal for persons who arrive on several thousands of small northern islands to apply for asylum based on their ‘irregular’ arrival. Australia has then established bilateral agreements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea to ‘receive’ these ‘offshore entry persons’ in reception centres run by the International Organization for Migration for ‘holding’ until their claims can be verified. Thirdly, Australia has increased border security at sea. (Claire Inder, “International Refugee Law, ‘Hyper-Legalism’ and Migration Management: The Pacific Solution,” in The Politics of International Migration Management, eds. Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécout (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 226.)
they would also seek to file claims. Filing status was by-far the more popular option: over 2 million asylum seekers have elected to file their claims within Turkey, whereas reports indicate just under half of that number have used the route Turkey provided from Syria and Iraq to Greek islands such as Lesvos, and into Eastern Europe. However, the high number of arrivals moving through Turkey quickly led to overcrowding in European detention facilities, overwhelmed the processing abilities of European officials, and led to a political breakdown in the European Union as suggestions of burden-sharing faced extreme opposition from a variety of states.

In response, the European Union established a return deal with Turkey, whereby all arrivals who have transited through Turkey are automatically returned. This is justified in two ways in the EU Return Directive: the first country of asylum, and the third safe country. The safe country of asylum indicates that once recognized as a refugee in a country, it is that country’s responsibility to provide protection. Meanwhile, the ‘safe third country’ premise states that an individual should file their claim within the first safe country they reach (‘safe third country’). In exchange for accepting returnees, Turkey has received €3 billion and eased visa restrictions on Turkish citizens visiting the EU, with a further promise of €3 billion. Perhaps most surprisingly, the EU has promised to resettle a parallel number of refugees as it returns to Turkey, up to 72,000 individuals. This number falls far short of the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers who utilized the Turkish route in order to file their status within the EU in 2015. Furthermore, it is important to note that those resettled are not the same refugees who have arrived in the EU via Turkey and subsequently been returned: instead, they are pre-selected by the European Union as eligible for resettlement based on criteria of whom and how many the EU wishes to assist. In fact, priority is given for resettlement to those who have not tried to ‘illegally’ enter Europe. By shifting to such a model, the European Union can therefore determined both how many and who can benefit from European protection under the refugee regime. This effectively replaces the previously

22 Ibid.
23 A safety third country is defined as “a State where a person could have applied for protection.” This is different from a ‘first country of asylum’, where an individual has filed a refugee claim and been provided protection from the State where that claim was filed. (Joanne van Selm, “Access to Procedures: ‘Safe Third Countries’, ‘Safe Countries of Origin’ and ‘Time Limits’,” (prepared for UNHCR and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001): 3-5.)
liberal asylum regime with a highly politicized resettlement system dominated by national domestic priorities and considerations.

This shift from asylum to resettlement is realized by a combination of both peripheralization and externalization policies. Peripheralization refers to the shifting of the ability to seek asylum to the outer edges of the EU, and is largely achieved through the Dublin Regulations (Dublin). These regulations are the effective Common European Asylum System, as they outline where an asylum seeker can file their refugee claim, and the rights and responsibilities afforded to individual states in relation to asylum seekers. Dublin condones securitization of asylum in its very nature: it was initially enacted to deter individuals from submitting asylum claims within multiple EU states, and to stop ‘asylum shopping’ within freedom of movement zones.

While Dublin grants responsibility first to state where the individual asylum-seeker has familial ties, without that link responsibility falls onto the state which plays the most significant role in the asylum-seekers entry into, or residence on, the territory of the EU. Given the increase securitization of air travel, and the popularity/feasibility of land and sea transit, this responsibility then by-and-large falls onto the states comprising the geographic periphery of the European Union. Furthermore, ‘return clauses’ within Dublin allow interior states within the EU to return asylum-seekers to their states of arrival, thus allowing centralized EU ‘core’ states to largely avoid asylum responsibility, save for what they voluntarily undertake through resettlement schemes or those few with pre-established familial ties.

---

27 The Dublin Regulations are comprised of three separate documents: the initial Convention which established the regulations came into force in 1997, and amendments have since been passed in 2003 and 2013. The most recent update was introduced in response to several European judicial decisions that challenged the presumption of equal treatment in all EU Member States, and therefore the legitimacy of the return clauses. (European Union, Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities ("Dublin Convention"), 15 June 1990, Official Journal C 254, 19/08/1997 p. 0001 – 0012; European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, 18 February 2003, OJ L 50 of 25.2.2003.; European Union: Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), 29 June 2013, OJ L. 180/31-180/59; 29.6.2013, (EU) No 604/2013).


29 Ibid, 303.


31 Return clauses are found in Section II of the Dublin III Regulations. For example, if an asylum seeker in Denmark was found to have accessed the EU through Greece, Denmark would be able to make a claim to return the asylum seeker and associates responsibility to Greece under these return schemes. However, the ECHR has sought to limit the utilization of these return policies in
Externalization, on the other hand, refers to the offshoring of the determination process (and therefore state obligations to asylum-seekers), and is pursued with the ultimate goal of offshoring or ‘blocking’ the ability to seek asylum within the EU altogether.\textsuperscript{32} Externalization processes will not only allow the EU to be more selective in who they do eventually sponsor through a resettlement program (further politicizing a regime designed to be solely humanitarian), but also seeks to alleviate the stress massive numbers of arriving asylum seekers are placing on periphery states such as Greece and Italy. Externalization policies are conducted in three major fashions: enhancing border security so that asylum seekers are unable to make claims in the EU in the first place; establishing readmission agreements with neighbouring states (like the EU-Turkey deal); and increasing the capacity of neighbouring states to process and assist asylum seekers.

**International Organizations and Asylum Policy**

IOs are defined as organizations with an international membership, scope, or presence. Depending on their mandate and capacities, and the context, IOs play both a service provision role, where they fulfill the wishes of various states, supranational, and international organizations; or a discursive, whereby their actions and rhetoric serve to shape/alter/perpetuate policies.\textsuperscript{33}

Recent literature has been published on how IOs have embodied both roles in the displacement management context. For example, Sarah Wolff’s article asserts that IOs are making a normative difference in their advocacy for rescue missions, expanding legal ways to access Europe, and the need to address stranded migrants, or those who are stuck in transit countries.\textsuperscript{34} Susan Martin implores the need for a cohesive approach, advocating for the inclusion of the IOM into the UN system.\textsuperscript{35} And Sandra Lavenex explores the ‘multi-levelling’ of EU external policies, coming to the similar conclusion that states are
more like subcontractors and rule transmitters over counterweights against dangerous state policies.\textsuperscript{36}

In line with this last thought, this paper asserts that despite efforts for IOs to introduce or implement asylum-friendly policies, the security priorities of individual EU States have relegated IOs to the role of service providers. Instead, their actions consistently reinforce, both directly and indirectly, the securitization of asylum pursued by States.

\textit{Camp Management}

Establishment of camps is essential in complex humanitarian situations: individuals need basic food, water, and security infrastructure following an emergency. The majority of refugee camps are managed by the UNHCR working in combination with a number of INGOs and governmental agencies. However, thanks to the protracted nature of displacement and decreasing likelihood of repatriation or resettlement, many refugee camps have effectively become warehouses for refugees who are unable to return home.\textsuperscript{37} In this regard, UNHCR-administered camps therefore have the negative effect of providing a scapegoat alternative for states to avoid discussions of asylum, resettlement, or integration within their own borders.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Relocation & Resettlement}

The European Union differentiates between resettlement and relocation. Resettlement refers to the “transfer of non-EU national or stateless persons who have been identified as in need of international protection to an EU State … on humanitarian grounds or with the status of a refugee.”\textsuperscript{39} Meanwhile, relocation refers to the “transfer of persons who are in need of or already benefit from a form of international protection in one EU Member State to another…”\textsuperscript{40}

Resettlement is considered one of the three pillars of durable solutions to displacement, alongside voluntary repatriation (to return to one’s country of origin) and local integration (to stay in country of asylum), and UNHCR is the main partner organization used to identify eligible participants for resettlement. As resettlement is seen as a privilege and not a right, UNHCR assesses each individual against these other durable solutions to determine when resettlement is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[40] \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the best solution. However, annual state quotas and preferences still ultimately determine how many and whom are relocated and resettled. While UNHCR has attempted to use its international reputation and clout to convince states to expand their resettlement operations, this has had little effect in the European context. In fact, member states have even shirked their pre-existing commitments to identify resettlement places to Greece and Italy, let alone created more spaces for relocation and resettlement.

Alongside UNHCR, the IOM – the world’s largest private migration management IO - is the main IO involved in logistics for both the temporary EU Relocation System and the new Turkey-EU 1-to-1 Resettlement deal. The Temporary EU Relocation System is a precursor to the long-sought but far-off Common European Asylum System, and calls for EU member states to voluntarily redistribute 160,000 individuals amongst all EU members. It furthermore requests EU member states to resettle over 22,000 refugees from outside of the EU “who are in clear need of international protection” over a two-year span.

---

41 This involves an age, gender, and diversity-sensitive approach, with special considerations given to pre-identified groups such as women and girls, children, the elderly, those living with disabilities, LGBTQ+, and minorities. (UNHCR, “Chapter 5: Protection Considerations, and the Identification of Resettlement Needs,” in UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011): 173.


43 One main exception was Germany’s temporary suspension of the Dublin Regulations during the midst of the crisis, which allowed refugees to make claims in Germany regardless of their first point of contact. However, this act was more about ‘leading by example’ towards a Common European Asylum System and the maintenance of the Schengen Zone than an internalization of or adherence to norms perpetuated by IOs. See: François Heisbourg, "The Strategic Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis," Survival 57, no. 6 (2015): 7-20.


45 As a private organization, the IOM is not restricted to a humanitarian mandate, and therefore there are no limitations in states submitting special requests on how many or whom it seeks to resettle.


However, it is important to note that little progress has been made: only 7,272/94,000 refugees have been resettled (as of 10 June 2016), and only 2,280/160,000 have been relocated (as of 14 June 2016). This may be in part to UNHCR’s objection to partaking in large parts of the Turkey-EU deal due to lack of human rights safeguards. This example highlights how even though IOs operate and compete in the same field, humanitarian mandates can somewhat ensure human rights limited protection for asylum seekers and refugees and hinder the full securitization of displacement.

Data Provision & Tracking

IOs are the predominant collectors and distributors of displacement information. For example, both the UNHCR and the IOM publish countless reports on statistics of displacement and migration trends which subsequently help shape how states and stakeholders perceive asylum seekers and refugees. In addition to these (oftentimes annual or quarterly) reports, many IOs also provide real-time data on migrant management. For example, the IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix is designed to inform humanitarian responses through a unified, systematic, and sustainable data collection system which provides reliable data on locations, vulnerabilities, and movements of migrants. While this information is provided to assist governments in providing “tailored assistance that respond to the vulnerabilities identified”, it simultaneously portrays asylum-seekers in a securitized fashion. Through reports and submissions such as this, asylum-seekers become something to be ‘warned about’ and ‘prepared for’, and individuals are tracked and monitored like criminals despite no wrongdoing.

49 The 94,000 is comprised of the two separate commitments to take 22,000 refugees globally, and 72,000 from Turkey.
**Enhanced Border Security & Non-Refoulement**

Frontex, an EU agency described as the ‘front line of defense of the Mediterranean border’,\(^5^5\) has ramped up border patrol operations in order to deter asylum seekers from utilizing Mediterranean Sea routes.\(^5^6\) This includes an operational budget increase if almost €50 million euros between 2014-15, and a shift in modus of operation from a friendly engagement model to one of an aggressive ‘deter at all costs’.\(^5^7\) While Joint Operations Triton and Poseidon have simply upscaled pre-existing operations in response to this new influx of asylum seekers, Frontex has recently introduced ‘Migration Management Support Teams’ for rapid deployment to pre-identified hotspots in order to support processing capacity and “organize return operations for those who have no right to stay.”\(^5^8\)

Troublingly, Frontex’s upscaled operations have re-opened questions about the EU’s commitment to non-refoulement of asylum seekers and refugees. Article 33(1) of the Convention forbids states from “expel[ling] or return[ing] ("refouler") a refugee in any matter whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of [the predetermined persecution grounds].” Furthermore, the UNHCR has issued an advisory opinion on the topic of interdiction at sea identifying that Italy (and by extension, the European Union) would still be bound by non-refoulement obligations regardless of whether boats are found in Libyan waters, so long as effective control is asserted over boats found.\(^5^9\) Yet Frontex’s ‘deter at all costs’ model, which includes pushback operations, comes precariously close (if not altogether over the line) to refoulement.\(^6^0\) Yet refoulement still isn’t the worst human rights abuse

---


\(^5^7\) Not that this began occurring before the ‘refugee crisis’ formally hit European shores. (Frontex, “Amended Budget 2015 N3”, available online: http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/governance-documents/).


reported. In 2015, Amnesty International published a report citing Greek coastguards robbing and torturing migrants, and even sinking their ships so that they couldn’t make it to shore.61

**Enhancing Neighbourhood Capacity**

Enhancing neighbourhood capacity entails a combination of increased border controls, to combat illegal migration and trafficking, and institutional capacity building, to develop and/or strengthen return, resettlement, and reintegration programs and infrastructure.62 This occurs both internally and externally. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund - the most recent system focusing on this initiative- seeks to streamline and strengthen the Common European Asylum System by supporting legal migration and integration, and enhancing return mechanisms throughout the 2014-2020 period.63 A further €19 million was allocated to Italy, €5 to Hungary, and €5 to Greece between 2014-2015 with a similar aim.64 Meanwhile, the Turkey-EU deal mentioned above is just one of many examples of similar policies that occur on the outskirts of the EU. Similar agreements existed prior to the most recent crisis, indicating the EU’s intention to outsource asylum even before the most recent events.65

In conclusion, while attempts to generate novel norms that respect the right to seek asylum have been made by some IOs –notably the UNHCR- these have largely been

---

overshadowed by the effective service role that the majority of IOs have fulfilled. In turn, IO’s willingness to fulfill the role of service provides has served to reinforce the normalization of the EU’s policy shift from asylum to securitized resettlement. Instead of establishing themselves as norm generators, IOs have effectively become the validators of state-established norms. This has ensured that securitization policies have become front and centre in displacement management, at the expense of more liberal, individual, and humanitarian-based norms.
References


**Treaty & Legal References**


