BORDERS IN GLOBALIZATION
Borders in Globalization Research Project 53

Borders in Globalization - Germany

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1. Introduction

2. History of the borderlands in your country

Currently divided between Denmark and Germany, the Sønderjylland-Schleswig region has, since medieval times, been frequently disputed. As a result, the exact location of the boundary has changed several times. This situation isn’t particularly original in Western Europe, where quite a few boundaries have been quite disputed and mobile. What makes Sønderjylland-Schleswig peculiar is that the latest border demarcation, conducted in 1920, results from a plebiscite, during which 75% of the North-Schleswig population agreed to be part of Denmark while 80% of the population of South Schleswig voted to remain in Germany. Since then, powerful nationalistic discourses, both in Denmark and Germany, have contributed to divide what could be regarded as a rather homogeneous cultural entity. The recent partition of Schleswig also had the effect of restructuring the regional trade system that had existed for centuries and redefining the role of regional centers, such as Sønderborg or Flensburg, which ended up being located at the very periphery of Denmark and Germany.

2.1. Evolution of the borderland regions in history

The history of the Sønderjylland-Schleswig region is inseparable from the one of Schleswig and Holstein, two disputed entities that belonged, in part or totally, to Denmark or Germany at some point in history. Until the 12th century, the Duchy of Schleswig was a part of the still rather feeble Danish monarchy, with the Eider river being considered the northern border of the Holy Roman Empire (Auge, 2013). It was then separated from the Danish Kingdom and ruled as a fief. The historical duchy of Holstein, in contrast, was a northern territory of the Holy Roman Empire since Charlemagne’s conquest of the Saxon territories until the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The two regions have a common history due to the fact that Danish kings were elected dukes of Schleswig and Holstein in 1460. Only in the 19th century did this constellation became problematic, when both a Danish and a German national movement claimed the region for their respective national project, using a mixture of dynastic, juridical, lingual and cultural arguments to support their claim. The movements had their centers in Denmark (especially Copenhagen) and Germany (with an important faction in Kiel), but were also supported by locals. Many others, though, maintained a Schleswigan identity loyal to the Danish crown. Still, in the wake of the Paris revolution in 1848, a provisional government was proclaimed in Kiel revolting against the Danish monarchy; in fear of a nationalist government in Copenhagen attempting to separate Schleswig from Holstein and integrate it into the
Danish kingdom. Denmark won the following First Schleswig War (1848-1851), because the European powers put pressure on Prussia to pull out their troops, which in the beginning had supported the Schleswig-Holstein insurgents. The peace treaty of London restrained the status quo: Schleswig and Holstein remained under Danish rule, but were to be kept separate from the Danish kingdom.

This framework proved difficult for further constitutional development and did not satisfy either side. In November 1863, Denmark passed a constitution that should be valid in the kingdom and Schleswig, a clear breach of the London agreement. Prussia took this as a casus belli and declared war together with Austria on behalf of the German Confederation. The Second Schleswig War (1864) ended with the defeat of Denmark and the incorporation of the two disputed duchies into the German Empire. The decisive battle at Dybbøl is still modern Denmark’s most important lieux de memoire, celebrated annually with participation of high ranking politicians and members of the royal family.

The conflict also resulted in the strengthening of nationalistic ideologies. According to Becker-Christensen (2001: 37), two groups started to consider themselves as minorities: the pro-German population within the Danish kingdom and the pro-Danish Schleswigians within Prussia, which became the German Empire. Formally, the minorities were recognized and institutionalized after the border drawing in 1920.

The end of the First World War and the defeat of Germany opened new possibilities for the Schleswig question. Denmark suggested organizing a plebiscite, which would address the delineation of the border with Germany. The idea of organizing a plebiscite actually dates back from 1866 (Peace of Prague) but could only be implemented before after the First World War. The Danish government asked the Allied Powers at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) to consider a plebiscite in order to strengthen a peaceful settlement of the border conflict. The proposition was accepted and two plebiscites were organized on February 10 and March 14, 1920. The modus was designed by Denmark: there were two voting zones, where the northern Zone 1 voted én-bloc, while the southern zone voted by parish. Today’s border is the line dividing zone 1 and 2. This line was already depicted as the most practical border between a Danish nation state and Germany in the 1890s by Hans Victor Clausen, a Danish historian.

In Zone 1, 74.9% of the voters wished to come under Danish rule. A noticeable proportion of the voters located in the southern part of the zone, however, indicated their preference for Germany, particularly in the area of Tønder and Højer. In Zone 2, 80.2% voted for Germany.

During the Second World War, the German occupation of Denmark exacerbated the hope of the German minority to obtain a border revision. This wish was, however, not fulfilled due to the German defeat and the border was not altered anymore. After the Second World War, the region experienced a period of intense nationalism (Klatt 2011a: 90) and a “cautious dialogue” (Becker-Christensen 2001) took place between the two countries. Despite being still rather homogeneous from a demographic and ethnic perspective, the region has remained a crucial political issue for both Denmark and Germany and very
little progress has been made to transform Sønderjylland-Schleswig into an institutionally integrated cross-border region.

2.2. Increased role of globalization in the borderlands

Sønderjylland-Schleswig has historically been characterized by an integrated labor market, which went far beyond the region. Intense seasonal migrations were taking place from Jutland to the richer farmlands of East Schleswig prior to the 20th century. In the 18th and 19th centuries, trade relations were also quite developed between Hamburg and the Jutland Peninsula, which resulted in economic and cultural transfers between Schleswig, Holstein, and beyond (Klatt 2014: 359). Instead of facilitating the development of such flows, the 1920 plebiscite resulted in a tightening of the border and marked the beginning of a new era for the regional economy. While population flows were largely free before the 1920s, visa requirements were introduced between the two countries, in place until 1954. Nation-building on both sides had the effect of severing social and economic ties and make regional integration more difficult than in the past.

Between 1920 and 1973, the border functioned as a barrier to labor mobility and one can hardly speak of an integrated borderland. In the 1930s, border region residents were allowed to work on the other side for a maximum of three weeks in a row. The situation became even more restrictive after the Second World War, as cross-border activities were restricted to material and cultural support of both national minorities. Sønderjylland-Schleswig experienced alienation rather than cooperation and border struggle rather than bridge-building during the 1950s. The region was peaceful, but contacts and exchanges between Denmark and Germany were limited. The first signs of rapprochement were made by Flensburg in the 1950s, followed by the launch of Danish-German conferences in 1954 (biennial cultural events) (Becker-Christensen 2001).

In the 1970s, while many other European border regions experienced a renewal of cross-border cooperation, both sides in the Sønderjylland-Schleswig region still maintained opposing positions as to whether and how cross-border cooperation should take place. Germany was – and still is – more favorable to institutional cooperation than Denmark, which regarded the German position as ideological. For Denmark, cross-border cooperation should be based on a case-by-case basis and remain as little institutionalized as possible. While Germany had a positive approach to cross-border cooperation as a tool to promote peace and heal the scars of the past, Denmark was full of reservations and rejected the idea of an institutionalized cooperation with Germany. As a result, no agreement of any kind, and no formal institution was accepted from the Danish side in Sønderjylland-Schleswig. In many respects, this opposition born after the end of the Second World War between an institutionalized and an ad hoc model, continues to define Germany and Denmark’s visions of cross-border cooperation in the region. One should note that the Danish vision is peculiar to Sønderjylland-Schleswig and profoundly influenced by the past conflicts with Germany. In the Øresund region, between Copenhagen and Malmö, the Danish state has adopted a far more offensive stand on cross-border cooperation with its Swedish neighbor, hardly any resistance – and much more investments – to facilitate regional integration.
Still, the beginning of the 1970s marked a change in the relations between the two countries. As Denmark became a member of the European Community (EC) in 1973, a more open labor market was progressively introduced in the region. The common market contributed to erase some of the obstacles that couldn’t be overcome bilaterally. The main progresses were made in the field of environmental issues, with the establishment of a Joint Committee for the Flensburg Fjord in 1972 (Becker-Christensen 2001). This institution was dissolved in 1974 and replaced, one year later, with the Flensburg Fjord Commission that aimed at defining mutual targets in order to improve the water quality in the fjord. In the mid-1980s, however, the Commission gradually lost its relevance and ceased to play an important role in the border region. Still it is a very interesting example of cooperation, as, contrary to usual cross-boundary water commissions, it never was formalized in a bilateral treaty. Furthermore, the members were local authorities only. Still, it was possible to agree on a cross-border action plan and implement it, too. As in other border regions, such as the Lake Constance region between Germany, Switzerland and Austria, environmental issues have often helped cross-border cooperation to evolve around practical initiatives. In the border region between Denmark and Germany, the environment has contributed to build cross-border networks between politicians and technicians that would prove to be useful for future cooperation.

Later on, another institutional change was related to the EU regional policy and the launch of the first Interreg program in 1989, which offered new possibilities of obtaining financial support for border regions. This originated in the first real common and cross-border action program between both states in 1988 (Klatt 2006b) and in the establishment of a Danish-German joint management committee. The Schengen Agreement, signed in December 1996 and implemented in March 2001 by Denmark, further facilitated informal integration of the region by removing the quite common traffic jams at the border checkpoints and the reopening of a number of smaller road- and bicycle/pedestrian crossing points. In 1997, Sønderjylland-Schleswig finally was institutionalised as a cross-border Euroregion; against considerable public resistance on the Danish side, though (Klatt, 2006, Yndige, 2012).

2.3. In colonized countries – history of first people in borderlands

Not relevant
2.4. Borderlands visions – cross-border cooperation

Unlike other regions in Europe where a common vision has progressively developed, such as in the Upper Rhine, Sønderjylland-Schleswig has, since the post-plebiscite in the 1920s, been characterized by conflicting national-building programs and powerful nationalist ideologies. Regional policies, when they existed, tended to favor integration to national systems rather than the emergence of an integrated political and economic cross-border region.

The development of a joint vision was hindered by the very practical Danish approach to cooperation, looking for tangible concrete results rather than the vision of a Schleswig reunited. Still, one leading Danish politician in the region (2000-2015) argued for a more offensive, integrative Danish role in the regional cooperation. Nevertheless, the political visions have remained rather airy.

There have been competing, more flow-oriented visions based on the Jutland transport corridor from central-Eastern Jutland to Hamburg, which is very important for Danish export; as well as business development visions tied to specific Interreg-projects. The latter have not necessarily focused on the narrower, historic Sønderjylland-Schleswig region, but included all territory eligible for Interreg-funding; which again has changed during the different funding periods.

After 1920, as Andersen (2006: 234) argued, “The German desire to maintain ties with North Schleswig stood in sharp contrast to the Danish wish to reinforce and demarcate the border”. The situation did not change much in the second half of the 20th century. Even when Denmark joined the European Community (EC) in 1973, the German advances to move towards an integrated cross-border region, in line with other regions that started to establish transnational cooperation structures in Europe, were met with reservations. It is only with the establishment of the European Cohesion Policy and the first Interreg programs in the 1990s that cross-border projects were envisaged with promises of European funding (Klatt 2011a: 92).

The first examples of cooperation concerned two sectors that are traditionally perceived as less political than others: the environment and the health systems. As explained above, joint initiatives aimed at improving the management of the Flensburg fjord. In the health sector, the Danish government developed cross-border policies that would allow its citizen to cross the border in order to get special treatments in Germany, as well as ambulance service from Germany in the immediate border communities. Another, so far unsuccessful initiative was to improve cross-border public transportation, which is notoriously slow and inefficient. It still takes at least 1 hour and 50 minutes to travel from Flensburg to Sønderborg by bus or train, while it takes only 35 minutes to cover the 40 kilometers that separated the two border cities by car. Tariff systems on each side of the border are not integrated either. Another vexing example of the lack of cross-border cooperation in the region concerns navigation. While Flensburg and Sønderborg are located along the same fjord, German tourist boats are not allowed to dock in Denmark,
supposedly because German regulations are not recognized in Denmark. As summarized by Klatt (2011a: 95), “cross-border business cooperation is not a specific strength of the region”.

The establishment of the Sønderjylland-Schleswig institutional region in 1997 provides another example of the rather antagonistic views on cooperation between Denmark and Germany. The region comprises the Danish county of Sønderjylland (which became separated in four municipalities after the administrative restructuration of 2007: Sønderborg, Aabenraa, Haderslev and Tønder) and the three German counties of Nordfriesland, Schleswig-Flensburg and the city of Flensburg (Klatt 2006b: 118). Its aim was to formalize and improve cross-border cooperation. The new region, it was argued, should “initiate joint activities to promote development in the region and create closer contact between community groups, businesses and voluntary organizations on both sides of the border” (Becker-Christensen 2001:46). To achieve its objectives, the Region would focus on four sectors: work conditions, with a particular emphasis on businesses and labor market policies; culture and languages; the environment, particularly coastal protection; and infrastructures, including cross-border planning and rescue services.

When the region was created in the late 1990s, there were strong positions on the Danish side against institutional cross-border cooperation that expressed a “fear of losing Danish sovereignty over Sønderjylland and of future German dominance and interference” (Klatt 2006b: 123). The debate was about preventing the Germanisation of Southern Jutland. The dominant opinion was that it was in Denmark’s interest to have a distinct and unquestionable border. It was also argued through the opinion of local populations and local politicians that the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation would lead to undermine what had been obtained at high cost by the previous generations, sometimes referring to events that were more than one century old, such as the 1864 War or the 1920 plebiscite. The debate had been quite passionate and often turned against the German populations on the south of the border with whom the Danish region would have to cooperate. The Danish reluctance towards the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation can be interpreted as a consequence of the Danish trauma of the German occupation during the Second World War.

Almost twenty years after its creation, the establishment of an institutional cross-border region still faces important challenges. Culturally speaking, it must be admitted, for example, that “there are no visible signs of a cross-border, regional identification in the population” (Klatt 2011a: 95). There is little awareness of Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig in the population, which remains fragmented along national, rather than regional, lines. If asked to determine their own identity, most people would probably present themselves as Danes or Germans. The only ones to refer to Schleswigian identity are the minorities. Even the name of the institutional cross-border region reflects the conflicting and unfinished process of integration in the region: Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig was chosen because Denmark and Germany couldn’t agree on a common name.
3. Culture of the borderlands in your country

The Danish-German borderlands are clearly a zone of cultural transition between Denmark and Germany and not a cultural island that would possess a distinct cultural identity. The cultural transition between the states is operated by the two officially recognized Danish and German minorities.

3.1. Borderlands as cultural spatial islands or transition lands

At the international level, linguistic minorities have been progressively recognized as transitional agents between the two nation-states. The formalization of their status within each of the states was encouraged by the Declaration of Loyalty of the German minority toward Denmark (1945), followed by the Kiel Declaration (1949), guaranteeing the rights of the Danish minority in Germany. Another milestone is the Copenhagen-Bonn Declarations signed exactly fifty years ago (1955), which officially recognized the minorities. The Declarations guaranteed the rights of the members of the minorities to choose their nationality and the rights to develop their own religious, cultural, and professional activities, in connection with Denmark and (West) Germany. The Declarations also include the right for both minorities to establish their own kindergartens and schools (Becker-Christensen 2014). Those are consequent steps toward complete equality of treatment on both sides of the border. At the more regional level, the role of both minorities is also crucial in promoting integration between the Danish region of Sønderjylland and the German region of Schleswig, and in facilitating intercultural understanding between linguistic communities. The minorities are well aware of their crucial role as regional facilitators and often describe themselves as bridges between the German and the Danish cultures and languages. An illustration of this role can be found on flag of the German minority, which includes two lions representing the two parts of Schleswig and a bridge between them.

Historically, a specific feature of the Danish and German minorities is that they were not displaced after the Second World War, nor were they forcefully assimilated in the majority (Haimin 2015). As the border was redrawn in 1920 following a plebiscite, the two minorities were allowed to develop their own identity, engage in social and cultural events, and establish minority-related institutions. Schools, political parties, newspapers, youth and sport, libraries and churches are among some of the most popular institutions created by the two minorities to highlight their differences and resist assimilation. On both sides of the border, such organizations were largely supported by their kin-state from a financial point of view.

The development of minority-related activities was encouraged by both Denmark and (West) Germany as long as this process of self-identification did not threaten their bilateral relationships. Minorities, it was argued by both countries, could develop in the borderlands but should not, as in the Basque Country between Spain and France, become a national issue. Political regionalism and nationalistic tensions in the borderlands would not be tolerated. In Denmark, despite strong appeals for re-unification from the minority, the state always opposed separatism movements in order to avoid resurgent border
disputes. Instead, Denmark created a liaison committee in 1965 to institutionalize a
dialogue between the Danish Government and the German minority and facilitate
problems in every-day coexistence in South Schleswig (Kühl 2001: 18). Similarly,
Germany instituted a liaison committee with the Danish minority’s political party. Both
Denmark and Germany agreed that their borderlands should become symbols of peace
and reconciliation after the Second World War. From this viewpoint, their minorities
located on the side of the border would maintain their own identity while being actively
participating in the social, cultural and political life of the foreign land. This is a classical
situation for cross-cultural communities, who must simultaneously maintain their
distinctiveness, on which relies their comparative advantage, and engage in social and
political activities with their host society.

Because both minorities are linguistic groups, language became one of the most crucial
issues of the Danish-German borderlands. Before the plebiscite in 1920, the communities
living in the historical region of Schleswig used to speak either Danish or German
depending on the social circumstances. As Haimin (2015: 3) argues, “Both Danish and
German languages were used in different circumstances and did not necessarily indicate
the speaker’s national loyalty”. The proportion of Danish and German speakers also
depended on the region. Whereas the southern part of the region mostly spoke German,
rural areas in Central and Northern Schleswig used a regional Danish dialect called
Sønderjysk (Kühl 2001: 15). The German spoken in the region was, for its part, known as
Low German (Plattdeutsch), a Germanic language from Northern Germany which had
been spoken by the merchants of the Hanseatic League between the 15th and 19th
centuries. The coexistence of several languages wasn’t particular to the Danish-German
borderlands and could be found in many European regions before a strict correspondence
between languages and national identity was imposed. After the Schleswig Wars in the
1860s and the partition of Schleswig in the 20th century, the mixed use of languages
became increasingly regulated by nation-states. Danish and German languages became
the building blocks on which each border communities asserted their cultural uniqueness.

3.2. In motion or stable – produced or reproduced – cultural continuity or discontinuity:

The existence of two peaceful linguistic minorities is one of the distinguishing features of
the Danish-German borderlands since the 1920s. As Kühl (2001: 24) argued, “The
definition and sustainable implementation of the minority regimes have been elements in
cross-boundary peace – and confidence – building”. One should note, however, that the
minorities only include a small portion of the border population. As expected, the
majority of the borderland population is far less concerned with the preservation of
cultural specificities than the linguistic minorities for which it is a matter of cultural and
political survival.

Over the last decades, Sønderjylland-Schleswig has experienced a number of cultural
changes that have transformed its regional identity and, generally speaking, eroded its
cultural uniqueness. As many regions in Western Europe, Sønderjylland-Schleswig has
been, for several decades now, increasingly integrated in the European Union and the
globalized world and does not constitute an isolated region. The increasing interactions
between the region, the EU and the world are reflected in many external influences and cultural changes. The local dialect, for which the region has long been known, is declining in favor of German or Danish proper while the use of English is increasing, particularly among the younger generation. This is especially true in Denmark, one of the countries where the proportion of people speaking English as a second language is highest in Europe (European Commission 2012).

At the local level, the German minority is included in the cooperation within Sønderjylland: its museum is a member of the South Jutland Museum Council. Many cross-border cultural initiatives have also been supported by EU funds in the framework of the Interreg program. The region Sønderjylland-Schleswig, for example, has been particularly active in promoting culture through diverse programs funded by Interreg III, IV and V. Most of the funding of the programs goes to micro-projects initiated by local associations. Given its limited cultural budget and human resources, the secretariat of Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig mainly responds to requests that are directly or indirectly linked to the borderlands, cross-cultural exchanges, and minorities and play the role of mediator and financial benefactor of local initiatives. These micro projects are aimed at bringing together the region’s citizens while creating new networks on both sides of the border. They are also supposed to overcome mental barriers, reduce obstacles to cross-border cooperation, and enhance tolerance and diversity in the region. For example, the KulturDialog program managed by the Region’s secretariat, which lasted from 2011 to 2014, was divided into 74 micro-projects for a total budget of 600,000 Euros (Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig 2014). It benefited myriad of local associations from both Denmark and Germany, such as the two main minority associations (Sydslesvigsk Forening and Bund Deutscher Nordschleswiger), local choirs (Grænsekorene, Sängerbund Schleswig-Holstein e.V.), festivals and other cultural and sport events.

At a more regional level, one of the most ambitious projects in recent years has been Sønderborg 2017 in which local institutional actors from the borderlands competed with other cities in Denmark and Europe to be designated by the European Union as European Capital of Culture. The project, entitled Countryside Metropolis, resolutely adopted a cross-border perspective to promote the region. The main message was that a high quality of life could also be achieved by small peripheral urban centers, particularly in border areas where synergies between countries are rarely used at the maximum of their potentialities. The project clearly aimed at changing the perceptions of the region in the mind of many Danes – for which Sønderjylland is often an unknown territory – and Europeans. It was carried out by a consortium of Danish municipalities from the border area, including Sønderborg, Aabenraa, Haderslev and Tønder, two German districts (Kreis) Nordfriesland and Schleswig-Flensburg, and the German city of Flensburg.

This is certainly not the first time that the border dimension is used by European cities to highlight their cultural specificities. A recent example that immediately comes to mind is the one of Luxembourg and the Greater Region (2007), where the comparatively small city of Luxembourg joined forces with other French, German and Belgium cities. A major difference is, however, that the Luxembourg candidacy was heavily supported by
the state, who used its considerable financial resources to invest massively in new
cultural facilities (opera, national museums, exhibitions etc.) and promote Luxembourg
as a major European cultural center. Another difference between the candidacy of
Sønderborg and the one of Luxembourg is that Luxembourg experienced a formidable
economic boom in the 2000s and attracted an increasing number of young and highly-
qualified workers from other European and North American countries, who were used to
world-class cultural facilities. Nothing of the sort is happening in Sønderborg and the
border region where the population is ageing and will be declining and where the growth
of economic activities is much more modest. By focusing on the European Capital of
Culture as a mean to counter the decline and negative representations of peripheral
regions, *Sønderborg 2017* expressed a strong – albeit unconvincing – message to the
European Union selection committee, who chose the rival city of Aarhus and its slogan
Let’s Rethink.

3.3. Cultural evidence of representation or expression of resistances

The expression of cultural differences in the region never took a violent form, which does
not mean that the people living in the borderlands did not express resistances towards
nation-states. Soon after the 1920 plebiscite, the members of the German minority who
had recently become Danish citizens expressed their allegiance to Germany and
“contested the legitimacy of the new border” (Haimin 2015: 4). The years after WWI
were difficult in terms of economic dynamic and this affected the whole region. North
Schleswiger, who were mainly traders, had to find new markets. The dissatisfaction of
the German minority was threatening to the stability of the border, which is why the
Danish authorities searched for practical solutions that would maintain peace in the
region. Youth education appeared as a priority and the Danish state made German
education available throughout the region.

Times were favorable to the development of the national socialist ideology among the
German minority. The favorable attitude towards education of the German youth ended
with the Second World War, during which Denmark was occupied by Germany (1940-
1945). After the war, the populations and authorities of Southern Jutland expressed an
extreme hostility towards Germany and the German minority, whose schools and
kindergartens were closed. This period of history highlights a fundamental lack of
understanding between the Danish majority and its German minority. The Danes never
perceived the German minority as genuinely German but rather as Germanized Danes
who had lived under German rule since the Second Schleswig War (Haimin 2015: 8).
The Germans living on the Danish side of the border, of course, perceived their identity
in a totally different way. For them, being part of a minority meant that they would
primordially be defined as Germans in a foreign land.

Education remained a central issue in the relationships between both minorities and the
state in the post-WW2 period and was perceived as a potential way to regain the loyalty
of the German minority. However the restoration of German education could only partly
take place considering that a large number of schools had been destroyed at the end of
war. During the 1950s the discourse evolved and focused mainly on finding a way for the
minorities to survive over generations. The promotion of an education linked to rural life context was used as a tool to urge the youth to stay in North Schleswig. A similar process took place on the Danish side of the border, with the German minority being supported by West Germany and encouraged to safeguard and develop its cultural specificity in a Danish environment. By the end of the 1960s, however, the German minority school system in Denmark became more inclusive of the Danish and the European dimensions. The purpose is now to educate youth connected to the German community and accustomed to the Danish language and culture. In other words, minority schools must accomplish a dual mission of introducing the students to their “national” culture and language and prepare them to live in a foreign state.

3.4. Zones of transition?

The border region between Denmark and Germany is a zone of transition which comes with different names according to the linguistic communities and national authorities. The linguistic minorities use the Danish term Sydslesvig to describe the southern part of the border and the German term Nordschleswig to describe the northern part of the border. Sydslesvig geographically extends from the river Eider and the Kiel Canal in the south to the German-Danish national border in the north and from the North Sea to the Baltic Sea (Bundesministerium des Innern 2008). Nordschleswig comprises the four municipalities of Tønder in the south-west, Haderslev in the north, Aabenraa in the south and Sønderborg in the east. The Northern limit of Nord Schleswig corresponds to the previous border of the Prussian Empire in 1864. Both Sydslesvig and Nordschleswig refer to the historical region of Schleswig, which had been part of the Danish Kingdom before the Schleswig War of 1864. When it refers to the Danish side of the border region, the Danish state uses the term Sønderjylland, which literally means Southern Jutland, without any reference to Schleswig. It is interesting to note that neither the minorities nor the states use a unique name to refer to the cross-border region. The members of the German minority living in Denmark identify as Nordsleswiger while the members of the Danish minority living south of the border refer to themselves as Sydslesviger.

The sensitive importance of names was reminded in recent history, when Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig was established in 1997. Numerous discussions were dedicated to the choice of the official name of the region. The German side defended the idea of a unique name “Schleswig” which would reflect the common history of the borderlands. This idea was not shared by the Danish side, which had adopted the term Sønderjylland for the Danish part of the borderlands. After long negotiations, the Danes and the Germans eventually agreed on the name Region Sønderjylland/Schleswig, which became Sønderjylland-Schleswig a little later. The addition of the hyphen in replacement of the slash being symbolically more linking than separating was the fruit of endless negotiations. The impossible task of finding a unique name for the region is interpreted by some scholars as a sign that the region did not succeed in creating a common space of action around the historical name of Schleswig (Klatt 2007: 176).

Because the decision of belonging to a linguistic minority is a personal choice, rather than an administrative decision, the demographic size of each minority group is difficult
to estimate. Depending on the sources, each minority represents approximately 5-8% of their population of the border region (Kühl 2001). The German minority in Denmark is estimated to count between 15,000 and 17,000 members, principally located in the cities of Tønder, Haderslev, Aabenraa and Sønderborg (Haimin 2009; Becker-Christensen 2014; BDN 2015). The Danish minority is probably bigger in size, counting approximately 50,000 members in 2000, many of them concentrated in and around the cities of Flensburg, Schleswig, Husum, Rendsburg and Eckernförde (Bundesministerium des Innern 2008; Becker-Christensen 2014; SSF 2015).

The demographic importance of the two minorities has also experienced considerable changes over the last half-century because several identities can coexist in a continuous interplay within communities. Thaler (2009) shows in that respect that there has been a considerable fluctuation in the number of people registered as members of Danish organizations in South Schleswig. The Danish minority organization in Germany called South Sleswig Association, for example, counted some 3000 members at the end of the Second World War but by 1946, this number had increased to 10,000. The number of members peaked at 70,000 members a couple of years later before declining and stabilizing at 20,000 after 1950 (Thaler 2009: 88).

3.5. Forms and re-forms of identity?

Discussed previously

3.6. Homogeneity or diffusion of identity

The communities living between Denmark and Germany are culturally very close. As Thaler (2009: 69) explains, “Their distinctiveness originated primarily in their sense of self and only subsequently acquired cultural overtones”. The absence of major cultural differences does not mean, however, that local communities do not perceive themselves as unique. A strong interest is dedicated to micro cultural differences that are only noticeable at the local scale. For example, the eating habits on both sides of the border may appear very similar to the foreign observer – potatoes, cabbage, pork, and sausages are popular dishes – but national communities display strong preferences for certain products. The choice of milk is a particular sensitive issue for Danish and German consumers, who express a strong preference for the one produced in their own country. Another classical example is related to cars. While most Danes are financially unable to distinguish themselves through their car due to very high taxes on motor vehicles – which add up to more than the price of the car – German consumers have a preference for expensive automobiles. These examples go beyond the local difference between border communities and also reflect national standards between Denmark and Germany.

3.7. Plural expression of identity or singular imperatives of belonging

The cultural identity of the region between Germany and Denmark has been influenced by the former Duchy of Schleswig. When the Duchy was separated and national borders drawn, the cultural identity of the region evolved under the influence of the two nation-
states and of the linguistic minorities. Each minority has its own cultural and educational facilities, such as Danish or German schools and kindergarten, and churches providing the salaries for Danish or German pastors. Two regional newspapers are published by the minorities. Der Nordschleswiger is a German-language daily newspaper founded in 1946 in Aabenraa. Its subtitle – Deutsche Tageszeitung in Dänemark – clearly indicates that Der Nordschleswiger aims at representing the German minority in Denmark. Its daily circulation is below 2000 copies in 2014 and in steady decline (DMO 2015). Flensborg Avis is the other minority newspaper. Founded 1869 in Flensburg by members of the Danish minority, Flensborg Avis publishes in both Danish and German. Like Der Nordschleswiger, the daily circulation of the newspaper is declining and reached less than 5,000 copies in 2014 (Flensborg Avis 2014), six times less than its local concurrent the Flensburger Tageblatt. The decline of the readership of minority journal is not unique to this kind of publication or to the region and affects many newspapers in Europe.

The linguistic minorities like to present themselves as cross-cultural agents who can actively participate in the further development of the borderlands. This aspect is often stressed by cross-border bodies and local associations, who highlight that minorities are bridge-builders of the region and facilitate intergovernmental and inter-regional cross-border cooperation (Becker-Christensen 2001, Klatt 2015: 2). However, it would be misleading to consider that the local identity of the border region only relies on the minority groups, who remain demographically small and do not have sufficient influence to make things change dramatically towards one unique feeling of regional identity.
4. Governance

(The regional studies will focus on a-territorial governance systems that challenge the existing primarily territorial order of bordering)

4.1. Are regulatory regimes regulating flows beyond the borderlands of your country (territories are undermined)?

Thus far, cross-border governance in the German-Danish border region has remained weakly institutionalized. Despite more than 20 years of institutional building, cross-border institutions have proved rather limited in scope and it is therefore difficult to speak of an emerging cross-border regime between the two countries. As described earlier, the reasons behind the limited development of cross-border institutions are to be found in the divergent vision of what cross-border cooperation should look like in the region. If Germany is rather favorable to reinforce regional bodies, Denmark has long been opposed to any concession that would have further institutionalized cross-border cooperation with its southern neighbor. As a consequence, most cross-border institutional initiatives have taken the form of ad hoc projects.

Created nearly forty years after the establishment of the first Euroregio between the Netherlands and Germany and ten years after the launch of the EU Cohesion Policy, Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig is the most advanced cross-border governance body in the region. The Region was historically established to facilitate integration between Denmark and Germany and contribute to reduce barriers to cross-border interactions. This original function is now supported by Infocenter, one of the few independent advisory services on the labor market in the region. Infocenter was created in 2004 as an Interreg III A project to facilitate information exchange in both languages and reduce institutional obstacles linked to the border, such as national legislations, language differences, or tax regimes. It targets commuters, companies, institutions and authorities looking for information and advices related to the cross-border labor market.

The institutional and political powers of Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig are virtually nonexistent. The activities of the Region are overseen by an Executive Board of eight members, and coordinated by a regional Council of 42 members, 21 from each side of the border. The Region’s secretariat, located in the Danish town of Padborg, acts as a mediator and consulting body for citizens and local associations. Six working committees and four specialist groups dealing with sport, the youth, languages, and women are responsible to implement the activities of the structure. The budget of the Region mainly relies on bilateral funding from the Danish and German authorities and on EU funding granted through ERDF funds and the Interreg program. Over the course of its short history, the Region has experienced several organizational restructuring which have all led to downsize its sectoral and political scope. Originally, the members of the regional Council established six different committees dealing with some of the most pressing issues of the region, including the environment, regional planning, health and social services, youth and sport, economic development, and culture and language. Following a first external evaluation in 2004, the Region was restructured along three committees.
instead of six (Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig 2006). In a region strongly affected by a lack of public cross-border infrastructures, demographic ageing, and economic stagnation, the issues related to regional planning, the youth, and economic development were considered, quite surprisingly, as not relevant for the cross-border body. Only survived the environment, health, and culture, three traditionally ‘soft’ areas of cross-border cooperation known for not interfering too much with politics. The external evaluation of the Region also pointed to a number of weaknesses, including a low level of visibility at the regional level, a lack of recognition for the work conducted locally, and leadership issues (Hjalager 2004). The regional Council was also considered too large and not efficient enough.

In 2009, the Region was again externally evaluated. In light of the criticisms expressed by the evaluation, the regional Council decided to restructure the organization and limit its activities to a single committee in charge of cultural activities (Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig 2011). Languages, culture and youth are supposed to be addressed by this unique permanent committee. The evaluation also expressed criticisms against the effectiveness of the regional Council and its lack of leadership (Hjalager 2009). Despite the competences and capacities of the regional office, the evaluation argued, the Region still misses a clear vision and an action plan to achieve its objectives. A high degree of bureaucracy was also considered an important limitation in its capacity of evolution. As a consequence, the organizational structure of Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig has been adjusted downwards: the Council and the Assembly have disappeared and been replaced with an Executive Board of 11 members and 11 deputies, an evolution that tend to pull the Region away from elected representatives and the people.

The criticisms formulated against the Region must be viewed in light of the limited political will of the two nation-states, who never really provided the political and financial conditions for the Region to flourish and develop a strategic vision for the borderlands. Thus far, the Region lacks jurisdiction over the administrative units that compose the Danish-German borderlands (Klatt 2006b: 135) and there are no signs that this will change in the near future. Its funding is also very much dependent on the Interreg program, which limits its activities to small-scale projects at the local level. Such micro-initiatives reinforce cross-border interactions and contribute to develop a mutual understanding in the region; however, they can’t replace a long-term vision for the years to come.

4.2. Are governance mechanisms operating through bottom-up dynamics (are they born in local politics?)

Cross-border governance mechanisms between Denmark and Germany do not operate through bottom-up dynamics. Quite the contrary. Governance mechanisms are dominated by state actors, which impose a limited agenda to the cross-border institutionalized region. Private actors and the civil society are involved in a minor way in the design and conduct of cross-border policies. This contrasts sharply with other regions in Europe where local chambers of commerce and private companies have established partnerships with regional authorities to promote cross-border regions, such as with Metrobasel.
between Switzerland, Germany and France for example. None of the two regional authorities – Southern Denmark and the Land of Schleswig – are intensively involved in cross-border cooperation.

In Denmark, the regional level has traditionally been a rather weak institutional actor due to the highly centralized political system of the country. As a consequence, it is the state that is the prime actor of cross-border cooperation. This appears particularly clearly in the Øresund region, where the institutional construction of a cross-border city region has often been interpreted as a national project, supported by massive public investments from the Danish state (Hospers, 2006). The construction of the fixed link between Copenhagen and Malmö and the development of increasingly formalized relationships at the regional level is part of a larger national strategy, which seeks to strengthen the position of Copenhagen as a global city competing with other European centers (Mathiessen, 2004; Hansen, 2013). In comparison with the Øresund region, the German-Danish border region seems to have received far less interest – and investments – from the central state, even though it currently faces great demographic and economic challenges.

Since the reform of January 2007, the public administration system of Denmark relies on five regions instead of 13 counties. Danish regions are mostly responsible for policy fields with little national strategic value, such as culture, the environment and health, and have very little political and tax authority. The Region of Southern Denmark, which is primarily dealing with border-related issues with Germany, consists of four of the former counties: Fyn, Ribe, Sønderjylland, and Vejle. Some of the responsibilities previously handled by counties have been divided up between the Danish State, and the new municipalities created by the reform, whose number has been considerably reduced, from 270 to 98 at the national level, and from 78 to 22 in Southern Denmark (OECD 2012).

In Germany, the German-Danish cross-border region hardly constitutes a priority for regional planning at the federal level, as can be seen from recent studies conducted by the German Federal Office for Building and Planning, which highlight that the main cross-border areas of interest for growth and innovation are those located in the southern and western parts of the country (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung, 2009). At the regional level, Länder have, of course, a major role in regional policies but the Land of Schleswig-Holstein is only marginally involved in cross-border governance. At the municipality level, and despite its proximity to the border, the city of Flensburg is not deeply involved in cross-border governance.

In addition to Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig, several other cross-border cooperation initiatives have been recently developed to reinforce regional integration between Denmark and Germany. The most important in scope is probably the cooperation between the University of Southern Denmark and Europa-University Flensburg that has recently celebrated its 20\(^{th}\) anniversary. The program financially supported by Interreg offers joint degree courses in economics and social sciences. The students have the opportunity to obtain degrees from both universities simultaneously. One should note however, that the initial ambition to teach jointly in both countries has been seriously
impeded by the recent decision of the Danish state not to allow Denmark-based professors to teach in Germany anymore. As a result, hundreds of students must take the bus to attend the courses delivered in Denmark. This example, which may seem anecdotal, is nevertheless a good illustration of the gap between the official discourses of both governments on cross-border cooperation and their political will to adapt national regulations to the specificities of border challenges. Another cross-border initiative is the Border Triangle (Grænsetrekanten in Danish), a network initiated by the cities of Sønderborg (DK), Aabenraa (DK) and Flensburg (DE), which, unlike Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig, was not primordially concerned with the territorial dimension of the borderlands but with inter-city complementarities. Created as a 3-year project in 2009, the Border Triangle aimed at boosting the development of the regional labor market, take advantage of the comparative advantages of each of the cities and involve the private sector. Due to political disagreement between the cities, the start of the project was delayed for one year. After a few years of implementation, the Border Triangle is weakly institutionalized and even if not officially closed, all initiatives are on stand-by mode at the moment. Finally, one can mention the planned collaboration between ambulances and fire fighters on both sides of the border that could insure the fastest proximity services for citizens in situation of emergency.

In the absence of massive public investments in the cross-border cooperation field, many cross-border initiatives developed in the region would not have been possible without the support of the Interreg program. Created to support cooperation between neighboring regions, Interreg is now in its fifth time-frame period 2014-2020. Over the years, the geographical scope of the Deutschland-Danmark program has experienced recent geographical and sectoral changes. Compared with the 2007-2013 period, the current program has been enlarged and now comprises the regions of Southern Denmark and Sjælland in Denmark and the Kreise Nordfriesland, Ostholstein, Plön, Rendsburg-Eckernförde and Schleswig-Flensburg, as well as the cities of Flensburg, Kiel, Lübeck and Neumünster in Germany (Figure 1 and 2). This restructuring is probably less important for the borderlands between Denmark and Germany in Sønderjylland-Schleswig than it is for regions of Sjaelland and Ostholstein, between which a 18-kilometer fixed link is currently being built by the Danes to join Lolland and Fehmarn.

Alongside with its enlargement the budget of the Deutschland-Danmark Interreg program has been increased by 30%, from € 67 to 90 million. The funding priorities reflect the evolution of the Interreg program, based on the EU 2020 strategy. To be eligible, regional projects must now primarily relate to innovation, the sustainable environment, the labor market, or the promotion of functional cooperation. Functional cooperation is understood through initiatives promoting the improvement of the institutional capacity of public authorities as well as better understanding of its neighbor by initiating cultural encounters between Germans and Danish. Each of these four domains is considered highly strategic for the Danish-German border region, which tries to position itself as a region of excellence for green energies.
4.3. **What is the role of International agreements and bodies in influencing state boundaries? Are they both local, national and powerful?**

Since its establishment in 1957 as a way, the EU has worked tirelessly to reduce the negative effects of national borders, while promoting cooperation between European regions and the emergence of cross-border governance regimes. While it is indisputable that the objective of further integrating markets has been achieved between Denmark and Germany, the level of cross-border cooperation in Sønderjylland-Schleswig is not as high as the EU envisaged when it designed its regional policies.

As underlined by Buch et al. (2009), the EU considers the free movement of workers as a basic economic freedom promoting flexibility and efficiency in the European labor market. This was made possible with the Schengen treaty, which introduced freedom of movement within the EU as a fundamental right. The first Schengen convention dates from 1985; by 1991 it was signed by eight countries and was first implemented in 1995. Germany was amongst the first countries to sign the agreement. The Schengen area was gradually extended within more nation-states and Denmark signed the treaty in 1996 and implemented it in 2001.

4.4. **Are international agreements also impacting non-state actors or the private sector?**

4.5. **What about information and communication technologies? Are they influencing borderlands and the borders of flows?**

The physical line separating Denmark from Germany has not only been often disputed; it has also a long history of being surveyed, marked on the ground, and guarded. From 1920
to 1958, border controls were practiced on a trail named the Gendarmenstien (border guards trail) covering 74 kilometers, from Høruphav to Padborg. Teams of customs officers were physically patrolling the borders, days and night, controlling people and boats that were willing to cross between the two countries. In 1959, border control was taken over by the Danish police and the Gendarmenstien became a touristic attraction. With the entry into force of the Schengen Treaty, of course, intern borders are not anymore controlled. However customs officers still work in Denmark. Instead, their tasks were transformed and nowadays customs officials can run spot checks defined at random on a certain distance from the border. Both German and Danish law enforcement agencies work in close cooperation through the special immigration control unit called Udlaendigkontrolafdeling (UKA). UKA was established in 2011 with special purpose of working on itinerant criminals. Some of UKA’s actions are for example to conduct random checks on buses and trains crossing the border as well as on motorways.

4.6. Are new governance mechanisms challenging territories and regulating flows? Are they a challenge to democratic principles?

In recent years, the EU has promoted several new legal instruments designed to promote cross-border cooperation, including the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). EGTCs were introduced in 2006 to create regional structures by enabling public authorities of various Member States to team up and deliver joint services, without requiring a prior international agreement to be signed and ratified by national parliaments (Jaansoo and Groenendijk 2014). Germany signed the agreement in 2007 and three EGTCs have so far been implemented on its national borders in Saarland (Eurodistrict Saar Moselle), in the Rhine district (Eurodistrict Strasbourg-Ortenau) and in the Great Region (between France, Belgium, Germany and Luxemburg). Denmark signed the agreement one year after Germany but EGTCs remain unknown in the country (CoR 2013), not even in the Øresund region where cross-border cooperation is primarily a state project which, by definition, does not need a regional agreement.

Formal political parties

In many ways, the Danish-German border region is as far as one can be from national politics. On the Danish side, where the entire political system is polarized by Copenhagen and its elites, Udland Denmark or Peripheral Denmark, as the region is often called, is one of the most marginal electoral districts of the country. On the German side, the border electoral districts are in a peripheral position towards the regional capital of Kiel, and Berlin. That does not prevent the Danish-German border region, however, to be connected to national political debates and to have a political life of its own.

The first peculiarity of the region is to have experienced a steady rise in influence of the right-wing populist Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti), which thrives in many rural and peripheral areas of Jutland. Having adopted a strong nationalistic position, the Danish People’s Party openly criticizes the process of European integration, depicts the border as a source of insecurity, and supports strict border controls. The Danish People’s Party, of course, opposes the idea of further institutionalizing cross-border cooperation
and governance in the region. Its nationalistic and populist message is particularly well received along the German border in Denmark, where many people feel that public jobs have disappeared or moved to Copenhagen in recent years and that the region is ignored from national politicians based in the capital city. The Party capitalizes on the empirical fact that Denmark experiences a concentration of highly-qualified jobs in the Greater Copenhagen region and to a lesser extent the Aarhus region, a long-term process that can only been slowed down, but not countered, by public policies (Hansen and Winther, 2014).

The second characteristic of the region is the existence of minority political parties. Each minority has its own political party: the Schleswigian Party (SP) for the German minority and the South Schleswig Voters’ Association (SSW) for the Danish minority. Both parties are involved in local – rather than national – politics. Politicians from the minorities may only occasionally be elected at the national level but always as part of a larger political formation. This has led the border region without a real political representation at the national level in Denmark or at the state or federal level in Germany. Cross-border cooperation and the promotion of culture are widely seen as political priorities for both the Schleswigian Party and its German-based counterpart, who like to see themselves as bridges between the private sector and the central authorities. Minority parties are represented in the regional council of Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig.

The Schleswigian Party recalls that after having lost its seat in the Danish Parliament in 1979, “it concentrates on canvassing for county council and local council elections until 2007” (SP 2015). After the structural reform of 2007 the Schleswig Party only took part in the municipal elections in North Schleswig. The SP has focused on regional policies for the benefit of the minority and the regional population in general. The Schleswigian Party sees itself as a mediator between Danes and Germans and as a facilitator of regional integration, involved in reducing the divisive effect of the border between North- and South-Schleswig. This is reflected in its campaign to demand equal subsidies for German kindergartens, youth clubs and leisure time centers and pledge for more flexibility in recognizing the needs and activities of German institutions in the region. As a minority party, SP is also strongly involved in strengthening local governments and rural areas, as manifested for example by its pledge in favor of a decentralized and collective production of electricity, a popular topic in a region which produces much of its resources from wind turbines and other green sources of energy. The party also encourages the maintaining of small schools and institutions and the development of all forms of public transport, which are notoriously slow between the two countries.

The party of the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein, the SSW, has adopted a rather similar political agenda. The party supports the regional development of the borderlands and equal rights for all in South Schleswig. The SSW is, like its Northern neighbor, particularly involved in the promotion of decentralized educational institutions, which ensure the perpetuation of linguistic minorities. From an economic perspective, the SSW argues that the border region should be structurally supported by the regional or central states, particularly when it comes to road and train infrastructure. It also promotes ecologically based traffic, and decentralized and alternative energy sources.
5. Flows

Jutland’s proximity to the Scandinavian markets, as well as its location at the edge of continental Europe, make it a strategic spot for the development of the sector of logistics. Two main strengths of the regional economy are road goods transport industry and cross-border shopping, while regional integration through cross-border workers commuting is very limited.

The Western mainland of Denmark is a narrow corridor for the passage of goods and flows of people on the route from Hamburg to Copenhagen. Southern Jutland developed since many years as a main logistic platform at the door of Northern Europe, a hub for transport and distribution of goods. German-Danish border is a strategic and necessary passage for transporters. As shown on the map for 2011, the transports of goods amount in the border region to 30.4 Mio tons for a total of 65 Mio tons (trucks, trailers and containers) that represents approximately 47% of all entries and exits in Denmark. The transporters benefit from the different infrastructures of the region: Highway South-North and port of Aabenraa, located 30 km north of the border.

Figure 3: Transports of goods for 2011

Source: Udviklingsråd Sønderjylland (2013)_ TransECO2

The Danish Ministry for transport recognizes indeed that traffic growth will engender a need for additional capacity on the E45 from Northern Jutland to the German border in a long-term perspective. The Danish-German transport Commission was initiated in 2011 as a part of the cross-border regional development strategy of infrastructures. The Commission is mandated to study the needs of densification of the road network of Jutland linked to these high figures. Their work identified and analyzed challenging elements of cross-border traffic and infrastructure such as a situation of continuous traffic congestion linked to the only existence of one four lanes highway. In this framework, the project of building a western road structure in the Jutland Corridor was developed with the purpose of improving the transport conditions in the cross-border area as well as the accessibility of the Jutland’s corridor (Danish-German Transport Commission, 2015).
The project of the Commission is based on the arguments that improving the fluidity of traffic in the area would provide eventually a direct route between Hamburg and Esbjerg on the Danish West coast (Figure 4). It would also offer better connections to the local Billund airport in central Jutland. The German-Danish transport Commission argues that the project would profit the economic development of the region by offering better connections for the international traffic flows between major cities while decreasing transportation time. On a regional cross-border point of view this project would also certainly be appreciated from cross-border commuters as well as tourists.

Figure 4: Jutland’s transport corridors

Source: The Danish-German Transport Commission, Nov 2015
The German-Danish border presents some cross-border labor-mobility, however the cross-border market is not strong and the process of institutional integration has marginally affected the level of functional integration in the region. Despite the active presence of linguistic minorities, regional integration between the South and the North of the German-Danish border has remained low compared with other border regions in Europe where cross-border bodies have been established and where cultural and economic exchanges are much more developed (Klatt, 2006). Detailed statistics on the exact number and destination of cross-border commuters, widely regarded as an indicator of spatial integration, are unfortunately lacking in the region. Available data suggest nevertheless that the labor market has until recently always been unbalanced in favor of the Danish side, where most of the cross-border commuters chose to work.

According to data from Danmarks Statistik and various other sources, the number of cross-border commuters working in Denmark has remained very low until the beginning of the 2000s, with less than 1000 persons crossing the border daily from Germany to the four border municipalities of Sønderjylland. In the opposite direction, only 400 commuters worked in Schleswig (Table 1). Between 2002 and 2008, the number of Germany-based cross-border commuters working in Sønderjylland experienced a relative steady growth, reaching 3730 persons in 2008. The relatively good macro-economic situation of Denmark probably explains this rise. From Denmark to Schleswig, the number of daily commuters has remained very low, probably at around 1000 people.

Table 1. Evolution of cross-border commuting in Sønderjylland-Schleswig, 1998-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commuters to Denmark</th>
<th>Commuters to Germany</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>1013</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1079</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1200</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>1236</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1577</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>1775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2138</td>
<td>2138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2930</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3218</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3730</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3289</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>8416</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3537</td>
<td>3537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3307</td>
<td>3307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Danmarks Statistik, Buch et al. (2009), RSS and SDU (2015). Note: author’s estimates for 2006 and 2007 (commuters to Denmark), and 2006-2012 (commuters to Germany) based on average annual growth.
An interesting evolution is that German workers in Sønderjylland have become more qualified, work less in industrialized sectors and more in the service sectors, have increasingly high revenues, and occupy more leading positions than in the past (Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig and University of Southern Denmark 2015). The economic crisis of 2007-2008 had an influence on the number of cross-border commuters by sharply reducing the incentives to work in Denmark from Germany. Figure 1 shows in this respect that a little more than 3000 workers cross the border to Sønderjylland in 2012, the latest year available. In comparison, more than 15,000 commuters commuted between Denmark and Sweden in 2014 according to the Øresund Committee.

These figures are hardly impressive when compared with other cross-border regions in Europe. In 2014, there were 165,000 cross-border commuters in the Luxembourg area (Statec 2015), 89,000 in the Greater Geneva region (Canton of Geneva 2014), and more than 50,000 in the Basel area (TEB 2015). Even when one takes into account the fact that Sønderjylland-Schleswig does not count many large urban centers, the number of cross-border daily commuters remains comparatively low. For example, Sønderjylland-Schleswig is comparable with the Euroregion Meuse-Rhine between Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Both regions share common characteristics such as a common history, national minorities or cultural proximity, and have experienced industrial difficulties. However Euroregion Meuse-Rhine counts five times more daily cross-border commuters (43’000) than Sønderjylland-Schleswig (EMR 2013).

The knowledge infrastructure of the border region is weakly integrated. Collaboration between scientific institutes in the Sønderjylland-Schleswig region is rather unusual/infrequent (Makkonen, 2015: 33). The higher number of scientific collaborations is done on the same side of the border, and then amongst North American scientific institutions. The first German institute ranks at the 11th place (Humboldt University, Berlin).

The results show that scientific features of research on both sides are particularly disparate. Scientific research on the Danish side of the border is mainly technical and involves physics, engineering, or material sciences. On the German side, the main fields of research are found within life and physical sciences comprising marine biology, environmental sciences and ecology.

5.1. *Do competing sectorial and issue-specific regulatory policies subject flows to various regulatory forms that are bordering?* Je comprends pas la question

There existed such interconnections before 1920. Directly linked to trade, they had influence on cultural transfers. One consequence of the drawing of the border was to cease most of these interconnections between what were now considered as different nations (Klatt 2014).
5.2. Are overlapping jurisdictional regulatory forms leading to new forms of bordering of flows?

A very intense debate took place in Denmark for years about a specificity linked to cross-border shopping. More than 50 supermarkets have developed on the German side of the border (Flensburger Tageblatt, 2015). In doing so, the retailers benefit from millions of Euros that are spent by Danish customers yearly. Until mid-2015, customers and retailers slid into a regulatory gap linked to cross-border sale of canned beverages that were not subject to deposit on the containers. Thus beverages, such as beer or soft drinks, were bought by millions of cans by customers who just needed to sign a form confirming that they lived on the other side of the border in order to benefit from the exemption of deposit tax.

This business is considered to have had positive and negative consequences. On one hand, it is at the origin of the creation of circa 3000 jobs in the border-shopping centers. On a second hand, it constituted an important environmental problem on the Danish side. The cans being not refundable, most of them were disposed of in regular garbage and escaped to recycling, and thousands of them were thrown in the nature (Die Presse, 2008). It is the duality of the business that is at the origin of the virulent debate that took place between authorities. All in all, the question is also about the important amounts of money spent by Danes in Germany for Danish products available at a clearly lower price.

This example of dysfunctional cross-border cooperation came eventually to a solution in June 2015 when the German and Danish governments signed an agreement with mutual concessions. The customers will still be able to buy Danish beverages on the German side of the border at a lower price than they would have paid for them in Denmark, in reason of the differentials between both Value Added Taxes system. However trade distributors will charge a deposit added up with the German VAT. Customers will then be able to get a refund for the deposit, but not for the amount of tax corresponding (3 Ministries agreement, 2015). This agreement may seem to have definitely closed the debate. However a new breach has soon showed up as it concerns uniquely the German Länd Schleswig-Holstein and not other border Länder such as Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Thus, one of the distributors already offered its customers to order online from its branch in Rostock and to ask for the option of pick-up in a Schleswig-Holstein shop (REF).

The second example illustrates a Danish specificity that has implications about the transfer of economic flows between Germany and Western Jutland. The ownership of a summerhouse is strongly considered as part of Denmark’s cultural heritage. These typical vacation cottages are widely spread in the Western coast of Jutland, which is less populated than Eastern Jutland. However the ownership of summerhouses in Denmark is the preserve of Danes. The law controls closely the period of occupation of vacation cottages, their use as secondary homes in opposition to primary residence, as well as the right for foreigners to purchase them (Nordregio, 2010).
Denmark experienced a strong increase in the acquisition of summer properties in the 1960s. It is in 1973 that Denmark has imposed this rule against European law during the negotiations of the entry of the country into the European Economic Community. During the negotiations for the accession of Denmark to EU and Maastricht treaty, in 1992, the topic was very controversial and the government obtained a waiver on this question, despite its opposition to the rule of free movement of capital in the EU. The sale of Danish summerhouses is restricted for foreigners and non-residents. Only the ones that have had a residency for 5 years or more are allowed to access ownership of recreation houses. The arguments for such restrictions date back to the time when Denmark felt the necessity of protection against its German neighbor, as well as coastal zone protection and preserve for Danish citizens (Nordregio, 2007; Politiken, 2015). In this way the government found a way of protecting the housing market and thus guaranteeing the accessibility of ownership of summer homes for Danes.

However the Danish Ministery of Justice may decide of dispensation to the rule. The dispensations count for 5% of sales in 2014 (Politiken, 2015) and in order to benefit from dispensation, the buyer has to show his particular sympathy and his ties to Denmark. These kind of subjective indulgences have increased in the past five years for the advantage of Northerners that form the majority of foreign buyers (Politiken, 2015). The question of revoking this rule has been brought back in the political debate. The pros argue that it would allow more investments in Denmark. Moreover most of the summerhouses are located in peripheral areas of Denmark and such new capital gains could help the enlarged economic development of disadvantaged areas. The cons, on the other hand, have a more nationalistic discourse that fears the large-scale land grab of wealthy foreigners. This point, of view, however seems to be rootless and all this is but fantasy and stereotypes (Debat, 2014).
6. Security

Wind, M. (2012)

In the security area there are three overarching themes:

6.1. Security policies
- Do flows and securitization go hand in hand in your country?

The German-Danish border is internal to the Schengen area and consequently there is no need for both countries to decide of specific measures to integrate cross-border flows. The European law rules the condition for entering the Schengen area and provides for securitization of the external borders. The EU law provides for organizing flows of people, goods and capitals. The membership of Denmark to the Schengen treaty, binds the country to allow free movements of people across its borders with Germany and Sweden. Marginally, right wing or populist politicians, who are quite influent in Southern Denmark, try regularly to raise the issue of securitization. A chapter of rebordering took place in Denmark in several waves.

The first crisis to be reported happened during the spring 2011 when the government, despite its belonging to the Schengen area, reintroduced border controls. These events must be linked to the increase in immigration of refugees from North Africa heading towards the EU in the beginning of 2011 (Scuzzarello and Kinnvall, 2012). The sudden increase of the media visibility of migrants nourished the citizen’s anxieties, which were exploited by right-wing and anti-immigrant parties all through Europe. The Danish government was pushed by the far-right nationalist Danish People’s party (DDP), who considered that with the implementation of Schengen, the country had given up parts of its power to rule within its own territory. According to Scuzzarello and Kinnvall (2012), it is the construction of narratives considering migrants as security threats to the community that led to the action of government and introduction of policy measures. The first customs officers were stationed at the Danish borders on 5th July 2011 (Wind, 2012). The reintroduction of passport controls at the German-Danish border was expected by the Danish government to help control a supposedly increasing Eastern European criminality. However the election of a new government in 2011 with Helle Thorning Schmidt as Prime Minister (Social Democrats, 2011-2015) ended the initiative and the passport checks stopped.

A second major episode of rebordering dates from 2015 and is characterized by the increase of security expectations in different countries of the EU. This is linked to external events, whose consequences are also felt in Denmark. The terror shootings in Copenhagen on 14 February 2015, or Paris on 13 November 2015, as well as the waves of refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria, who crossed Europe heading to Germany and Sweden have left their impression in the border region between Germany and Denmark. Since then, controls of people crossing the border are organized on a more systematic basis and referendums linked to EU law are organized in several countries. The Danish
government has also organized a referendum at the end of 2015 with the purpose to take a position on the strengthening of Danish participation in European safety programs. Denmark is jealous of its sovereignty and this feeling is well read through the 3rd December referendum results. The whole country rejected the referendum to strengthen the cooperation with the EU. Only the largest cities resulted with a majority for more cooperation (Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense). As for the Danish side of the border region that is traditionally influenced by the nationalist Danish people’s party (DDP), the results show a clear distrust of the European project and a confirmation of Eurosceptic patterns. The nationalist party exerted its influence in Southern Jutland in order to gain numerous votes against the strengthening of EU law. Moreover, the project of the EU to allocate quotas of refugees per member state arose the Danish fear of losing control on the country migration policy. Especially since Denmark’s migration policy is quite restrictive and by the end of 2015 has welcomed circa ten times less refugees than its Swedish or German neighbors.

The targets of security programs in Denmark are incoming migrants, terrorism, drugs and weapons smuggling and social dumping (Wind, 2012). All these topics are linked in a way or the other to the control of the borders. It seems that it was mainly the issue of sovereignty that came front in the debate. This question is indeed very sensitive in the Danish border region and made a large difference on the final results of the vote. With this vote, Denmark has excluded itself from Europol, a supra-national instance controlled by the European Council of Ministers that regulates the actions and fight against organized crime. These events were followed with a major episode of rebordering that took place in the Danish-German borderlands in the beginning of 2016. Controls at the border and passport checks were implemented at Danish borders on January 4 (see for example Heeger, 2016; Tollstrup and Danielsen, 2016). These measures are however not followed by the German side of the border, where in the contrary opinions seem favorable to an open border (Tönnermann and Schwenzensen, 2016).

- How do trans-border illicit networks affect borderlands in your country?

The German-Danish border region is not regarded as a corridor for illicit goods in Europe unlike Gibraltar for example.

- Are borderland communities resisting security and security policies?

The events of rebordering that occurred in 2015 led to several, but small, demonstrations at the German-Danish border (Søndberg, 2015) in favor of closing the border, while in other Danish cities, furthest apart from the border like Aarhus or Odense (Søndberg, 2015), demonstrators were supporting opened borders.

- Is there interagency cooperation in security. Europol, CB cooperation between local polices?

6.2. Security and rights
- Are there constitutional powers and security including horizontal and vertical distributions of powers?

Due to the strong centralization of Denmark, the cross-border region does not have any constitutional powers. Security falls within national spheres.

- Competing and legitimate notions of security: no, the Danish, as well as the German states are regarded as legitimate authority.
- Comparing your country security policies with Canada and North America.

In northern Europe, the debate on securitization has not reached the scale of the issue such as discussed in Southern and Eastern Europe. This is mainly for the reason that all the national borders of Denmark are internal of Schengen and the EU. The country doesn’t have any EU external border.

6.3. Liberal - Democratic norms and Security technology
- Technology
- Biometry
- Risk assessment
(The regional studies focus on Infrastructures of security and policy cooperation)
Sustainability écrire un paragraphe sur le projet zero

- What environmental issues in your country remain governed by territorial strategies and what issues do not? For instance, natural preserves and parks for habitat maintenance, in particular, complicate management, for instance when migratory species and agreements on managing birds rely on parks and reserves.


- In your country, are there examples of management strategies of environmental issues that are amenable to bordering?
- How are climate changes issues dealt with in your country? Is the territorial dimension remaining a fundamental governing mechanism what is taking over?

(Regional studies will focus on water issues across borders)

**Region Syddanmarks klima- og bæredygtighedspolitik**

Region Syddanmark arbejder for at udmønte nationale og internationale mål for klima og bæredygtighed. Regionen vil aktivt medvirke til at skabe klimaeffektive og innovative løsninger.

Regionen vil arbejde for løsninger, som både løser lokale og regionale udfordringer og som samtidig har et markant potentiale for at bidrage til vækst i regionen. Regionen vil invitere til bredt samarbejde med kommuner, erhvervsliv og øvrige parter for at løfte opgaven.

Region Syddanmark vil arbejde for at opfylde følgende mål:

**Klima**

- At reducere udledningen af CO2 i den geografiske enhed Region Syddanmark med 40 % i 2020 i forhold til 1990.
- At reducere CO2-udledningen med 40 % fra drift af regionens egne aktiviteter og institutioner i 2020 i forhold til 2004.

**Miljø - Sundhed**

- Region Syddanmark vil iværksætte initiativer både på det somatiske og det psykiatriske område, som vil bidrage til at øge middellevealderen i regionen.
- Region Syddanmark vil arbejde på at reducere forbruget af miljøfremmede og hormonforstyrrende stoffer i regionens indkøb af varer.

**Corporate Social Responsibility**

- Region Syddanmark vil være kendt for sit gode arbejdsmiljø som led i at skabe attraktive og effektive arbejdspladser.
- Region Syddanmark vil arbejde for at anvende sociale klausuler som et aktivt styringsværktøj til at stille krav til regionens leverandører og på den måde gå foran i forhold til at løfte et samfundsansvar
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