BORDERS IN GLOBALIZATION
The fragmentation and geographic dispersion of production activities has generated concern over the challenges of governing corporate activities. Transnational corporations (TNCs), critics argue, are free to capitalize on favourable regulatory conditions of almost any country simply by moving production activities. This, in turn, reduces the bargaining power of labour and governments and complicates efforts to govern corporate behaviour. State borders, from this view, are porous and ineffective in a global economy where TNCs dominate as economic intermediaries. Yet this ignores the possibility that rather than being subsumed under global economic processes, state borders are changing in nature and significance. This paper examines the role state borders play in governing global production networks related to mineral and metal production. It argues that rather than disappearing, state borders are being evoked and transposed in the discourses and practices of corporate, state and civil society actors as they compete to influence production processes and their outcomes. It illustrates these arguments with a detailed examination of Goldcorp, a senior mining company with operations across the Americas. It demonstrates the need to move beyond understandings of state borders as static lines and towards examining their productive potentials and contested dimensions in global economic processes.
The structure of international trade has undergone profound shifts in recent decades. Advances in communication and transportation combined with the liberalization of trade and capital flows has made it more profitable for companies to outsource large portions of their manufacturing and service activities abroad. The vertically-integrated and geographically concentrated production structures dominant during the Fordist era have therefore largely been replaced by fragmented and dispersed forms of production. Such forms have been alternatively labelled as global commodity chains, global value chains and global production networks. The growing mobility of capital, goods and services has raised concerns over the power and predatory practices of transnational corporations (TNCs). TNC, critics argue, are free to capitalize on favourable regulatory conditions in almost any country; they simply need to move or subcontract through a firm located in that jurisdiction. This in turn reduces the bargaining power of labour and governments while complicating efforts to govern corporate activities (Feenstra 1998). From this view both states and state borders are porous and ineffective in a global economy where TNCs dominate as economic intermediaries.

Yet ignoring the persistent effects of territory and borders on global production processes encourages analysts to exaggerate their smooth functioning. Despite their apparent fluidity, such processes are grounded – however temporarily – in the sociopolitical and historical contexts where each node is located, which renders them susceptible to contestation. Moreover, it is possible that rather than disappearing under the weight of global economic integration, state borders are evolving and changing in significance. Understanding this changing significance for global production processes requires moving beyond understandings of borders as static lines between states and examining how they are constructed and transposed through discourse and practice. This paper examines the role borders play in the governance of global production networks (GPNs) beyond their physical-territorial manifestations. It looks specifically at the context of precious metal GPNs, which have undergone considerable expansion in the last decade. The mining industry has been largely overlooked in GCC/GVC/GPN literature,\(^1\) which is likely due their dependency on static mineral deposits and associated fixity. At the same time, the growing literature on (neo-)extractivism has largely ignored the potential of GPN analysis. Yet the internationalization of mining production and mining companies raises the need to examine the grounded versus global qualities of mineral and metal production. Examining mineral and metal production in this way provides unique analytical purchase on the interconnectedness of actors and processes across space. It also opens up the opportunity to critically examine how borders are construed, evoked and leveraged in discourse and practice by different actors in different sites.

The following section briefly reviews dominant theories of GCC/GVC/GPN governance and critically analyses the extent to which they allow for examining the changing role of state borders. Traditionally, authors understood governance as the capacity of dominant (lead) firms to

\(^{1}\) For excellent exceptions to this see Dougherty (2008; 2011) and Bridge (2008).
govern by dictating the organizational characteristics of production chains. The result is that authors lose sight of the social and political contexts in which production takes place in favour of highlighting their transnational qualities. More recent theories conceptualize production processes not as a vertical chain of value creation but as a constituted by (and constituting) a complex, multiscalar network of actors embedded in sociopolitical contexts. This perspective provides greater opportunity to examine how state borders are employed by actors seeking to influence both production processes and outcomes. The third section provides a brief discussion of global mineral and metal production and weighs their grounded versus global qualities of such processes. This lays the necessary background for a deeper examination of the gold production networks carved out by Goldcorp and how the Canadian border has been reproduced by actors seeking to govern them. This case study demonstrates that rather than disappearing, the Canadian border has played an important and productive role in aiding the expansion of production processes in which Goldcorp dominates. Yet, in playing this role, the Canadian border(s) have also become sites of contestation and have informed the strategies activists use in their efforts to govern mineral production. Understanding the changing significance of borders in the era of global economic integration therefore requires rethinking the nature of borders and their relationships to corporate and non-corporate actors.

State Borders and Theories of GPN Governance

The study of GCCs/GVCs/GPNs has been characterized as both an analytical approach and a theoretical framework. As a methodology, such analysis involves deconstructing the various stages or phases through which common place objects travel, which better illuminates several issues not fully captured by nation-centered political economy approaches. This includes, for instance, the social and political conditions under which a commodity or product was made, how the material qualities of products inform production processes and capacities and the different impacts this has on development, and the agency of national borders (Dougherty 2008, 32 – 33). While such methodological advantages have been widely acknowledged, as a body of theory, the study of global production processes is marked by considerable diversity and disagreement, particularly as it relates to who or what governs contemporary production processes. The notion of GPN governance, Gibbon et al. (2008, 319) observe,

rests on the assumption that, while both disintegration of production and its re-integration through inter-firm trade have recognizable dynamics, they do not occur spontaneously, automatically or even systematically. Instead, these processes are initiated and institutionalized in particular forms as a result of strategizing and decision-making by particular actors.

Early theories under the GCC / GVC terminology focused on how inter- and intra-firm decision-making dictate the organizational and spatial configuration of production chains. ‘Governance’ was typically understood from this view to refer to the capacity of large firms to dictate the organizational and structural qualities of production chains. Only recently have researchers
sought to strengthen understandings of the broader social, political and material dimensions of GVC governance by acknowledging the multiplicity of actors and institutions involved.

Yet a persistent lacuna in the literature on GVC governance involves the evolving role of state borders, which have largely been abandoned in favour of highlighting the transnational qualities of production processes. Yet numerous studies demonstrate that state borders continue to have relevance under integrationist pressures and have taken on new roles in global processes (Hage 1996; Johnson 1884; Agnew 2008; Paasi 1996; 2009; Shapiro and Alker 1996). There is a need, therefore, to examine how such insights might enhance understandings of GPN governance. As this section discusses, this requires on one hand, a more nuanced understanding of how borders originate and function and, on the other, a multidimensional understanding of GPN governance that is attuned to the political, social and material conditions that give rise to different forms and strategies of corporate governance.

The analysis of what were first called commodity chains originated in the late 1970s and early 1980s as an element of world systems theory. Wallerstein and Hopkins (1994, 17) described the disaggregation and spatial dispersion of economic activities as resulting in the constitution of ‘commodity chains’ defined as ‘a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’. The chain analogy meant to highlight the interconnectedness and interdependencies between firms engaged in the production of a single commodity with the implication that any change in one node would reverberate along the chain. Hopkins and Wallerstein argued that lead firms aimed to reduce transaction costs, which played a central role in shaping the chain’s configuration. However, the desire to reduce labour costs through geographic dispersion and subcontracting as well as the cyclical expansion and contraction of the world economy also impacted the chain’s structure.

Gary Gereffi built on this with the concept of global commodity chain (GCC), defined as ‘sets of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy’ (1994, 2). Gereffi aimed to develop a theory that would account for the governance structures found across production chains, ‘governance structure’ being ‘the authority and power relationships between firms that determine how financial, material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain’ (1996, 97). Influenced heavily by transaction-cost economics, Gereffi argued that most are characterised by one of two governance structures: there are producer-driven chains, which are dominated by large TNCs who control a tightly integrated production system. This was most likely found in industries that entail high upfront costs and / or that are technology-driven (e.g. vehicle or computer manufacturing); and, buyer-driven chains where the power to organize production activities lies predominantly with large retailers, brand-name merchandizers and trading companies. Both chains were dictated by the desire of dominant firms to minimize production costs, the difference being the type of firm exerting control and their position in the chain.

The concept of value-chain emerged in international business studies as a means to focus analysis on the question of who adds (and captures) value and where along the chain (see Kogut 1986; Humphrey and Schmitz 2000, 10). Geriffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) employed the
term while developing a new theory that aimed to explain network forms identified in later studies not captured by Gereffi’s GCC theory. This approach combined Gereffi’s insights with those of economic sociologists who criticized transaction cost economics as possessing an under-socialized account of human action. Most notable was Granovetter (1985) who argued that standard (economic) accounts of economic networks obscured the importance of interpersonal relations. Social relations between actors, derived from repeated interactions, generate mutual expectations and bonds of trust that could constrain opportunistic behaviour. Trust and cooperation, in turn, could be reinforced through the development of codes and standards. As such, Gereffi et al. recognized that trust, reputation and mutual dependencies “dampen opportunist behaviour, and in so doing…make possible complex inter-firm divisions of labour and interdependence than would be predicted by transaction costs theory” (2005, 81). From this view, institutions, both private and public had a role to play in GVC governance to the extent that they enhanced cooperation between individuals. The authors used this insight to postulate the existence of three categories of production networks: the modular network, relational network and captive network. The nature of which is determined by the complexity of transactions, namely whether the information and knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular transaction is high or low, the extent to which information can be codified and transmitted efficiently, and the capacity and skills of suppliers (Ibid., 85).

This latter approach entails a subtle shift in understanding of what constitutes GVC governance. Gereffi et al. (2005) do not refer explicitly to the power of lead firms to drive a chain’s organization along its entire length, but rather approach governance as a form of coordination characterized by inter-firm exchanges at specific nodes along the chain (Gibbon et al. 2008, 323). The emphasis therefore is placed not on who holds power and power asymmetries, but on how governance is exercised and why it takes the form it does in a particular case (Bair and Palpacuer 2015, 4). The result, however, is that the authors lose sight of Gereffi’s original emphasis on power relations (Bair 2008, 354).

Yet the approaches have more in common than they differ. First, both rely heavily on the rationality assumption of transaction cost economics. Governance structures are theorized as emerging primarily from the challenges faced by rational, utility-maximizing participants. The GVC approach acknowledges social and institutional contexts only insofar as they influence firm decision-making regarding optimal solutions (Gibbon et al. 2008, 324). This leaves no room to explore how sociopolitical, ideational and material factors shape corporate culture (values and beliefs) and firm behaviour. Second, their firm-centered perspective and emphasis placed on internal determinants of governance ignores the possibility that external actors (i.e. state officials or civil society groups) might use coercive tactics to shape corporate behaviour and production processes in opposition to firm decisions. This is despite the authors’ acknowledgement that history, institutions, geographic and social contexts, the evolving rules of the game and path dependence matter. Gereffi et al. admittedly neglect such variables to ‘simplify and abstract from an extremely heterogeneous body of evidence, [to identify] the variables that play a large role in determining patterns of value chain governance while holding others at bay’ (2005, 82).
Both approaches have received criticism for neglecting the political and material dimensions of GVC governance (see Whitely 1996; Gellert 2003). Paul Gellert (2003, 57) asserts that ‘GCC writers have lost the historically dense stories and complicated political struggles among states and firms in particular cases and at particular nodes on the chain.’ Markets, he argues, are politically constructed and must not be taken as a natural occurrence. It is also unclear whether the type of chain governance is influenced by the type of product being produced. The production processes that dominate manufacturing and technology-driven industries, for instance, are considerably more mobile than the production of raw materials which are rooted to geographical sources and entail complicated topographies of extraction. This makes them more conducive to TNCs seeking favourable regulatory environments, cheap labour and cooperative states (Ibid., 59 – 60). Given these gaps, he concludes, GCC / GVC approaches are perhaps limited to providing a descriptive characterization of the changing geography of production than the governance of production chains and their outcomes.

Numerous scholars have pushed for greater recognition of the role that state, supra-state and civil society actors play. While not denying that the internationalization of production processes has produced new governance challenges, researchers convincingly show that such actors play important roles in GVC governance by adopting new strategies (Sell and Prakash 2004; Talbot 2004; Ponte and Sturgeon 2014). For instance, scholars of corporate social responsibility (CSR) demonstrate that civil society actors influence corporate behaviour by monitoring companies, raising awareness of harmful practices and proposing more socially responsible solutions (see Bartley 2003; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005). Yet as Bair and Palpacuer (2015) recognize, incorporating non-firm actors into studies of GVC governance requires an expanded understanding of what governance is and the forms it takes. By focusing on the internal factors that determine inter-organizational dynamics and how they are coordinated, GCC and GVC governance theories explain a narrow dimension of industrial governance (1). Yet in its broadest sense, they argue, governance refers to ‘the explicit or implicit “rules of the game” that enable and constrain domains of behaviour and the ability of particular actors to set and / or enforce them, either via formal authority relations or through other forms of power’ (4). This expanded definition of governance opens greater room to encompass the governance role of actors outside the production chain.

Moreover, both approaches eschew state borders in favour of highlighting the transnational qualities of production processes, which leaves no room for examining their evolving nature and significance. Underpinning the theories is an image of state borders as relatively fixed, physically identifiable lines that exist between states. If borders do feature as an aspect of governance, it is only insofar as they circumscribe the boundaries of a regulatory jurisdiction and influence firms’ cost-benefit analyses, for example, on where to relocate. Yet from the view of critical border theorists, borders are first and foremost social, political and discursive constructs whose specific nature and meanings are historically contingent and often contested between social groups. As such, they can be visible and invisible and manifest themselves in symbols, infrastructures, discourses, ideas and practices (Newman and Paasi, 187; Paasi 1996; Galah and Newman 1995; Leimgruber 1991; Agnew 2009). In terms of governance effects, at their most basic level, borders
Constitute lines of separation or contact. This may occur in real or virtual space, horizontally between territories, or vertically between groups and/or individuals. The point of contact or separation usually creates an ‘us’ and an ‘Other’ identity, and this takes place at a variety of sociospatial scales (Newmand and Paasi 191).

Borders, that is, play important roles in identity construction, setting out inclusions / exclusions, and defining and redefining relations between social and physical space (Newman and Paasi 188). In this way, borders come to reflect power relations, social institutions and culture. Yet if all borders are social constructions in this way, it follows that their changing significance for GVC governance must be located in the discourses and practices of social groups as they aim to contest and shape corporate practices. Excluding the agency of external actors to shape production processes leave GCC and GVC theorists ill equipped to examine state borders as such.

Several scholars have proposed an alternative theory that opens up greater space to examine the multiplicity of actors implicated in GVC governance under the term global production network (GPN) (Dicken 2003; Henderson Dicken, Hess, Coe and Yeung 2002). The concept of production as opposed to value or commodity is meant to refocus attention on the social processes involved in producing goods and services and reproducing knowledge, capital and labour power. The tendency of GCC/GVC analysis to rely on orthodox economic paradigms, Henderson et al. (2002) argue, has stripped analyses of its social content. Yet the nature and articulation of production networks are deeply influenced by the concrete sociopolitical contexts within which firms are embedded. The chain metaphor, they argue, reinforces the tendency to treat firms as autonomous from their sociopolitical contexts because it gives the impression that production processes occur along a linear, vertical trajectory. Taking inspiration from actor network theory, the authors reconceptualise production and distribution processes as a complex network constituted by human and non-human agents. Network acknowledges the horizontal, diagonal and vertical linkages between actors directly and indirectly involved in production processes at multiple scales. Power and knowledge are theorized as flowing in a non-deterministic and multi-directional manner that is not entirely reducible to the leadership of a dominant firm.

Employing the metaphor of network enables researchers to explore the more complex social geographies implicated in global production processes (Henderson et al. 2002, 445). GPNs, from this view,

do not only connect firms functionally and territorially, but also they connect aspects of the social and spatial arrangements in which those firms are embedded and which influence their strategies and the values, priorities and expectations of managers, workers and communities alike (Ibid.,451).

‘Embedded’ is understood in two senses: First, territorial embeddedness means that companies do not merely locate to particular areas, but absorb and are influenced by the economic and social processes that already exist in those places. Network embeddedness, on the other hand, refers to the strength and durability of the formal and informal connections between network
members across space. This dual understanding opens up the possibility that non place-specific processes penetrate and transform place-specific ones and vice versa.

Rather than assuming a universal rationality, the GPN framework recognizes that firms, governments and other actors from different societies often have different priorities in terms of profitability, growth and economic development. As such, a production network’s impacts on firms and economic growth is not solely determined by the logic of its organization and the distribution of corporate power within it, but is also shaped by external actors with competing interests and objectives. The GPN framework also acknowledges the multiple forms of power beyond corporate power (i.e. the capacity of a given lead firm to dictate chain composition and structure). This includes institutional power, which refers to the exercise of power by the national or sub-national state, inter-state agencies and international organizations; and, collective power, which refers to the capacity of collective agents (i.e. NGOs and trade unions) to influence company actions either directly or indirectly by appealing to consumers, governments and international organizations. Thus the GPN framework is more capable of addressing the agency of multiple actors in multiple forms. It also acknowledges aspects of governance beyond who determines the structural qualities of production processes and encourages scholars to question who (or what) influences firm behaviour and production outcomes.

Yet a modification is needed. Despite the recognition Henderson et al. (2002) give to territorial embeddedness, they argue that production networks nevertheless “cut through” state boundaries in highly differentiated ways, influenced in part by regulatory and non-regulatory barriers and local socio-cultural conditions, to create structures which are “discontinuously territorial” (446). The argument that production processes ‘cut through’ state boundaries risks downplaying the agency of borders as social constructions. Attention instead must be paid to the productive potential of state borders and how they operate and are contested in different ways and in different places. This requires understanding state borders as transposable and reproducible through discourse, practice and symbols. This opens up a number of new questions regarding the relationship between state borders, corporate actors and production processes. For instance, how do TNCs construct and employ state borders as ideas in ways that enable them to exert power over production processes and insulate practices from contestation? How do civil society actors leverage state borders in their own discourses and practices to contest harmful forms of corporate practice? The following case study illustrates the benefits of incorporating a more nuanced understanding of state borders into the GPN framework.

Global Mineral and Metal Production Networks

This section examines how corporate, state and civil society actors reproduce the Canadian border in their discourse and practices as they attempt to govern gold-mining production networks in Latin America. It first lays out the typical structure of mineral and metal GPNs and outlines the tensions between their grounded versus global qualities. This is meant to provide the necessary contextual background for a deeper analysis of border producing practices and discourses in GPNs dominated by Goldcorp, a senior mining company with operations across the Americas. The central objective is to illustrate how state borders, rather than being subsumed by global economic processes, play a productive role in governing GPNs. In doing so,
it demonstrates the need for a different way of thinking about state borders and how they function in and under global production processes.

The *global* in GCC/GVC/GPN terminology refers to the fragmentation and spatial dispersion of production and supply activities as well as the increasing speed and ease with which components and services move across borders. Yet there are tensions in describing extractive networks as *global* in the same sense as it applies to the post-fordist forms of activity that characterize most other industries. Most processes involved in mining - including exploration and assessment activities, building the infrastructure (e.g. road and bridges) necessary to exploit the deposit, mineral extraction and initial processing - are fixed to the specific sites in which mineral deposits are located. It is not until the refinement phase, involving the purification of mineral concentrates, that materials are shipped across state lines. Refineries also typically purchase materials from multiple suppliers, making it difficult to trace the material’s entire production from beginning to end (Dougherty 2013, 347). A mineral GPN is therefore less mobile than those of other industries, such as t-shirt or cell phone manufacturing, and are territorially embedded to a stronger degree in their host markets. The growing scarcity of commercially viable mineral deposits in recent years has only served to exacerbate this territorial dependency and, in turn, the embeddedness of extractive activities.

In the last century, the locus of mineral GPNs has shifted from resource-rich developed countries in Europe and North America to the developing world. This movement was spurred by the depletion of accessible mineral deposits in the West; technological advances that enhance the feasibility of mining previously inaccessible deposits in remote, less developed regions; and, the development of enormous ocean going vessels that facilitate the trade of mineral commodities in bulk (ICMM 2012). It has also been aided by global neoliberal restructuring and the adoption of extractive strategies in the global South (Bebbington et al. 2008; Bebbington 2009; Bridge 2004). This is while refineries and suppliers of advanced services, technology and machinery are located predominantly in the developed world and emerging economies like Brazil and China. Therefore while developing countries are increasingly bearing the disruptive costs of mining in terms of its environmental and social impacts, much of the added value which stems from processing, refining and fabricating continues to accrue in more advanced economies.

Mining GPNs are global in several other senses beyond their capital flows. First, they bring together a diverse network of business actors and corporate interests. With increased global competition for resources and the entry of new players from emerging economies, the global mining industry has expanded considerably in recent decades. While successive waves of mergers and acquisitions beginning in the 1990s led to the relative disappearance of medium-sized mining companies, small junior mining companies have proliferated. As such, the industry is polarised between junior firms and global-scale seniors (Ericsson 2012). Junior firms are most

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2 According to InfoMine, a mining database, the United States hosts the greatest number of mining supply firms at 5,776 followed by Canada (3,698), Brazil (3,487), Australia (2,974) and Chile (1,847) as cited in CMA (2015).

3 As Michael Dougherty (2013, 343) observes, mining firms are typically categorized by their number of sites, levels of capitalization and primary sources of revenue. Junior firms are typically funded through venture capital, with activities primarily in exploration and make profits largely from the sale of discoveries to larger firms. Mid-tier firms are typically junior firms that take on one or few extraction activities, deriving their capital from both equity
active in exploration and typically make their profits from the sale of discovered deposits to senior firms that possess the capital, expertise and capacity to exploit the deposits. Junior companies therefore play an important role in expanding extractive frontiers, however, the structure and organizational characteristics are more strongly influenced by senior mining firms. Senior firms often operate multiple mines at once and therefore create interdependencies between mining sites. For instance, project disruptions in one site can have important impacts on the company’s ability to exploit other deposits.

Mineral and metal GPNs therefore most strongly reflect Gereffi’s producer-driven chain model in terms of industrial governance as they are often dominated by a senior firm that exerts considerable power over the organizational qualities of the network. However the growth of the global mining industry has also encouraged expansion in relating supply industries such as consulting and machinery and equipment manufacturing. With rising pressure to decrease production costs as a means of capturing higher rents, junior and senior companies are also relying increasingly on subcontractors who are occupying an increasingly important role. For instance, junior firms typically contract out geological assessments due to the lack of in-house geological expertise, leading to the emergence of highly specialized consulting companies focused on mining (MacDonald 2012, 36). Each mining site therefore brings together, and is dependent upon, a diverse and geographically dispersed business network.

It is important to note that mining companies demonstrate discernable differences in the corporate culture and therefore do not easily fit the purely rationalist assumptions of GCC and GVC analysis. Junior mining companies, for instance, are more likely to focus solely on business activities while attempting to maintain a low profile in host-communities than senior mining firms which are more likely to prioritize community engagement and social responsibility. This is because junior companies often lack the managerial capacity, experience and financial ability to engage local communities in meaningful dialogues about the nature of their work. This often leads to misunderstandings and conflicts with local communities, which senior companies inherit after they purchase the discovery or amalgamate the junior firm into their operations. As such, senior companies are more likely to have experienced conflicts with host communities in the past, which generates greater public skepticism of their practices elsewhere. Senior companies are therefore more likely to embrace social responsibility as a means to mitigate poor public perceptions of their operations and to create the long term co-operative relations with host communities that they depend on (MacDonald 2012).

Mining companies of any size with global operations are subject to a host of voluntary and binding domestic and international rules meant to promote corporate social responsibility. At the international level, this includes the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the International Financial Corporation’s Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and the Global Reporting
Initiative. Despite this dense network of international rules and guidelines, mining companies continue to come into repeated conflict with local communities over land rights and displacements, environmental degradation, and profits. Indeed, many Latin American governments in countries with prominent mining industries have been subject to growing calls for efforts to capture a greater share in the benefits from extractive activities on behalf of local communities.

Yet many developing countries lack the institutional power needed to monitor mining companies and hold them accountable for harms done either because they lack capacity, suffer from corruption and fear that actions taken against the company would drive away needed employment opportunities and government revenue. This complicates efforts to monitor mining companies and hold them accountable for harms done under domestic and international law. The collective forms of power exerted by civil society groups therefore have become an important dimension of broader efforts to govern mining companies. The next section provides a brief discussion of how one senior gold-mining company evokes and transposes the Canadian state border to aid the expansion of its role in precious metal GPNs and govern its relations with actors in host-states. It also examines the border-producing practices of state actors and civil society groups as they seek to govern the company’s operations and outputs. While the borders and boundaries in GPNs are arguable multiple and fluctuating, the aim of the following case study is simply to examine one particular kind of border in terms of both its productive potential and its nature as a site of contestation.

**Goldcorp and the Contested Reproduction of the Canadian Border**

In Canada, successive governments of varying ideological stripes have made a concerted effort to facilitate the expansion of the Canadian mining industry since the 1980s. Recently, support for Canadian mining companies has taken the form of financing and insurance through Export Development Canada (EDC), tax breaks and funding to support the delivery of development projects aimed at benefitting communities living in or near mines owned and operated by Canada-based mining companies. The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) has become an important source of generating capital for many mining companies. In 2013, the TSX was home to 57 percent of the world’s publically listed mining companies. Currently the TSX hosts 267 senior firms while the TSX-Venture Exchange hosts 1,112 more junior companies with specialties in precious metals, uranium, iron ore and zinc. The majority of companies are involved in Canadian projects, however many have adopted an increasingly global focus. 18 percent of companies undertake projects in Latin America and 12 and 7 percent in the United States and Africa respectively (MAC 2015, 35). Canada’s favourable policies therefore play an important role in facilitating the expansion of mineral and mining GPNs worldwide.

Goldcorp is senior mining company incorporated in Ontario and listed on the TSX. Over the last decade it has gradually extended control over precious metal GPNs by securing access to large-scale mines and absorbing smaller companies. Currently, Goldcorp owns and operates mines in Canada (Ontario and Quebec), Mexico, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina and the Dominican Republic (see Table 1). Most mines produce gold however some also have mixed deposits. Most deposits were discovered by junior companies that sold their discoveries or were
subsumed by Goldcorp. Goldcorp also undertakes its own exploration activities however they are typically carried out by US and Canada-based consultants and sub-contractors on behalf of the company. Much of what is extracted from the mines undergoes initial processing at or near the site in order to produce gold doré bars, which are unrefined metal concentrates. The bars are then transported to refineries under contract with Goldcorp to be processed into almost-pure metal according to the London Bullion Market standard. Once produced, the bars are allocated a number and imprinted with an LBM registered refiner’s mark and sold on the London spot market by Goldcorp-retained marketers (Goldcorp 2016, 1-15). In this way, Goldcorp retains control over a significant portion of the gold GPN and its profits until the gold is sold to international banks where it is stored or to jewelers and manufacturers for further fabrication. Concentrates of other minerals taken from mixed-deposit mines are sold and transported via trucks or ships to third-party refineries in Canada, Europe and Asia where they are mixed in the processing stage with metals from multiple sources.

**Table 1: Goldcorp Mines Currently in Operation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine &amp; Location</th>
<th>Production Phase</th>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Controlling Stake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red Lake Dryden, Ontario, Canada</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Élénone Opinaca Reservoir, James Bay Region, Quebec, Canada</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porcupine Timmons, Ontario, Canada</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musselwhite Opapamiskan Lake, Ontario</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borden Gold Chapleau, Ontario</td>
<td>Development (Prefeasibility study)</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochenour Red Lake, Dryden Ontario, Canada</td>
<td>Development (Drilling, sampling and test mining)</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peñasquito Zacatecas, Mexico</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold, Silver, Lead and Zinc</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Filos Mezcala, Guerrero State, Mexico</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Iron-Gold Ore</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Sauzal Chihuahua State, Mexico</td>
<td>Remediation, Closure</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlin Mine San Miguel Ixtahuacan, Guatemala</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Ore</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumbrera Belen, Catamarca province, Argentina</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold, Copper</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pueblo Viejo Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>40% Barrick Gold: 60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerro Negro Santa Cruz Province, Argentina</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Martín San Ignacio, Honduras</td>
<td>Closed 2008</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camino Rojo</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Gold-Silver</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 Includes all mines listed on Goldcorp’s corporate website however this does not include mines operated by associate firms.
Goldcorp is typical of other senior mining companies in that its strengths lie in extraction as opposed to exploration and processing phases. It also occupies a central position in, and creates interdependencies between, various mineral GPNs. For instance, high performance at the company’s Peñasquito, Cerro Negro and Musselwhite mines in 2015 offset low production elsewhere and sustained the company’s efforts to ramp up the Éléonore mine (Goldcorp 2015, 2). Goldcorp has also carved out an extensive global network of subsidiaries incorporated in countries like Argentina, Mexico, Luxembourg, Barbados and Switzerland. Its subsidiaries own many of the company’s mines and / or oversee aspects of the country’s finances and sales (see Figure 1). The company also invests in what it calls ‘associate firms’. For example, Goldcorp had a 25.9 percent equity interest (down from a high of 40%) in Tahoe resources and 19.3 percent in Primero Mining Corp. Goldcorp sold its stake in Tahoe resources after it became embroiled in heated conflicts with its host-community however Goldcorp claimed that it stemmed from a desire to focus on core assets in light of dwindling global gold prices. Goldcorp is also publically listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Among its top institutional investors are leading financial and asset management companies based in the United States, Europe and Canada (see Table 2). Its ownership therefore cannot be attributed to a specific country, but spans an international range of investors.

Table 2: Top Institutional Investors of Goldcorp as of March, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>% Ownership (March, 2016)</th>
<th>Country of Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Van Eck Associates Corporation</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Eagle Investment Management, LLC</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBC Global Asset Management Inc.</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmignac Gestion</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD Asset Management Inc.</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd.</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackRock Fund Advisors</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Vanguard Group Inc.</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisan Partners, LP</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity (Canada) Asset Management ULC</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the international breadth of its operations and ownership, Goldcorp identifies as a Canadian company based on its incorporation in Canada and on the fact that it is headquartered in Vancouver, British Columbia. This identity is reinforced through discourse and by the various symbols the company employs in marketing. For instance, Goldcorp’s Vice President of Corporate Affairs Brent Bergeron asserted before the Government of Canada’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development that

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Goldcorp is a Canadian company with its head office in Vancouver, and a worldwide workforce of approximately 14,000 employees. If you take a look at a world map where Goldcorp currently has its operations, you would think that we were focused on the Americas…However, the majority of our company’s production still remains here in Canada…While Goldcorp continues to expand significantly at the international level, we are also committed to managing and expanding our operation in Canada.6

Adopting Canadian corporate identity in discourse and symbolism is a powerful border producing practice that enables Goldcorp to govern its relationship with network participants and community members in several ways. First, it serves to include Goldcorp within the category of companies that are eligible for support under Canada’s pro-mining policies to the exclusion of others. This includes the favourable tax incentives, the financial support offered through Global Affairs and EDC and the diplomatic support state officials undertake in host-markets. For example, in 2010 Goldcorp and Barrick Gold received project funding from EDC for the construction and operation of their jointly owned Pueblo Viejo gold mine and its associated processing facilities in the Dominican Republic (EDC 2016a). While the physical presence and commercial viability of the deposit as well as inter- and intra-firm decision-making have much to do with the companies’ choice of project location, Canadian state resources played an important role in aiding the company’s capacity to undertake it. In 2015, Goldcorp also received between $100-250 million in EDC financing to expand the company’s working capital, which was necessary to maintain domestic and global operations (EDC 2016b). This is while the Canadian Pension Plan invests heavily in the company, currently owning $110 million in stocks, down from $256 million in 2011 (CCIP 2016). These investments have helped the company to establish or expand mineral GPNs by reducing transaction costs and displacing business risks from the company and onto the Canadian state.

Claiming Canadian corporate nationality also grants Goldcorp to access, and is reproduced by, the diplomatic support of Canadian officials. Indeed, Canadian diplomats have intervened on behalf of the company in several instances. In 2004, the Canadian Ambassador to Guatemala published an article in a Guatemalan newspaper citing the benefits of mining to indigenous groups in Canada, with the implication that Canadian mining companies would bring the same benefits to groups in Guatemala. This article was published at a time when Glamis Gold, then owner of the Marlin mine in Guatemala, was facing increasing opposition from surrounding indigenous communities in relation to its plans to develop the mining site (Miningwatch 2013). In September 2012, for example, Goldcorp sponsored a trip involving one Canadian senator and four Members of Parliament who travelled to Guatemala on the company airplane to meet with the Guatemalan Legislative Commission on Mines and Energy. Although no official reason was given, the trip occurred at a time when Goldcorp was facing increased opposition from local community members and immediately followed an announcement by the Guatemalan government that it was considering new mining legislation that would increase the government’s share of mining profits (CBC 2012).

The same year, Trade Minister Ed Fast attended the opening of Goldcorp’s office in Buenos Aires, which coincided with the opening of its Cerro Negro mine in Santa Cruz province. Fast also met with Argentina’s Minister of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services and the Secretary of Energy to discuss the benefits of Canadian mining in Argentina (Global Affairs Canada 2012). The diplomatic practices conducted on behalf of Goldcorp reinforce the company’s claimed socio-spatial identity as well as the boundaries it erects between its operations and its host-community. This identity, in turn, has been instrumental in the company’s efforts to shape its regulatory environment abroad and also helps Canadian officials to extend the frontiers of its pro-mining policies. It also serves to include its operations outside of Canada within the complimentary category of ‘foreign investor’. This grants Goldcorp access to the formal and informal incentives governments provide to attract and maintain foreign capital. This includes access to the Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements signed between Canada and host-governments, low corporate tax rates and royalties, often lax environmental reviews and monitoring, and policing services.

Yet the boundaries Goldcorp erects by claiming Canadian corporate citizenship are also increasingly sites of contestation and have influence on the strategies civil society actors adopt to govern the company’s activities. While Goldcorp is emblematic of many other senior mining companies in its discursive and institutional commitment to corporate social responsibility, it has come into repeated conflict with affected communities living in or near its mining projects. Indeed, community members have mobilized to demand a greater share in the profits derived from the extraction of local resources and to protest environmental damage, health concerns and instances of land expropriations caused by mine development and operations. Most conflicts are deeply rooted in the historical struggles of campesino and indigenous groups for access to land, resources and cultural rights as well as those of labour movements for access to worker rights and benefits. The richness of these struggles cannot therefore be captured in the space provided. This analysis is therefore limited to illustrating how such conflicts relate to reproductions of the Canadian border and governing Goldcorp GPNs.

On one hand, civil society groups have used collective power to challenge the artificial boundaries Goldcorp constructs around its operations when it claims Canadian corporate citizenship. This has occurred in several cases where community members drew attention to the company’s embeddedness in and relationship to, local communities and environments. For instance, workers at Goldcorp’s Cerro Negro mine in Santa Crus, Argentina went on strike in May 2016 in protest of plans to reduce the mine’s labour force, causing the mine to temporarily close. The workers, represented by the Asociacion Obrera Minera Argentina, accused Goldcorp of cutting employment positions under the guise of a voluntary retirement scheme in violation of its stated commitments to the community. The retirements, workers argued, were not voluntary nor retirements, but systematic firings. Workers also accused the company of not complying with the 70/30 law that stipulates local residents must constitute 70 percent of the workforce and relying too heavily on staff from Canada and the US (Bermúdez 2016). In doing so, workers used collective action as a means of influence corporate decision-making while asserting the power of local norms.
The El Morro mine in the Atamaca Region of Chile Goldcorp also faced disruptions in 2011 when members of the surrounding Diaguita Huasualtino indigenous community brought a legal claim against the company. Residents challenged the Environmental Assessment Resolution issued by the environmental authority that approved Goldcorp’s environmental impact study before Chile’s Supreme Court, demanding a halt to the operations. Residents specifically challenged several irregularities contained in the assessment, including the company’s failure to properly consult community members whose lands would be destroyed in the process of the mine’s development. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favour of the residents and issued an injunction that prevented further construction until consultation processes had been conducted (Goldcorp 2013, 9; Paley 2012). It is important to note that community protests in both Cerro Negro and El Morro had an important impact on Goldcorp GPNs. In the former, social protest by labour groups interrupted the fluidity of the production process while causing the company to re-evaluate its plans to cut labour costs. In the latter, community activism returned the project to its pre-feasibility study phase, temporarily preventing the mine’s construction.

Two higher profile instances of collective action taken against Goldcorp occurred in relation to the company’s San Martin mine in Honduras and Marline mine in Guatemala. The San Martin mine, fully closed in 2010, was located in the Siria Valley of Central Honduras has been embroiled in controversy with local communities for over a decade. Community activists and the Siria Valley Defense Committee have protested the environmental destruction caused by the mine’s development and operation, pointing to harmful amounts of arsenic and lead in local water sources, deforestation and resulting health problems and food insecurity in surrounding peasant villages (Gordon and Webber 2014, 604). Goldcorp however refused community demands for further reparations, having undertaken initial remediation measures and established community infrastructure during the mine’s closure. Yet community members and independent evaluators continue to find instances of deteriorating health conditions and polluted water supplies, which the company attributed to community members’ poor diet and lack of hygiene (Rights Action 2008).

Goldcorp’s Marline mine, which occupies lands of both the San Miguel Ixtahuacán and Sipacapa communities in Guatemala, has also faced significant social opposition. The mine was first operated by Glamis Gold, which was later bought out by Goldcorp. Opposition to the mine began during the exploration states, as local residents protested Glamis Gold’s inadequate consultative practices. In response to the perceived lack of input, the municipality of Sipacapa organized its own consultation process in June 2005, with a referendum resulting in 98 percent of residents voting against the mine. The Guatemalan government rejected the results and allowed the mine to move forward. Similar opposition bubbled up other communities surrounding the mine and was fueled by environmental and public health concerns after independent experts confirmed the presence of high levels of manganese, aluminium, copper and iron in local water ways used for drinking and irrigation. Community activists blockaded the company’s access to the site on several occasions which were met with repression from private security forces used by Goldcorp to protect the mining site (Rights Action 2008). Several anti-mining activists also received violent death threats and there have been reports of several murders of activist leaders.
Mayan activists presented a Constitutional Petition to the Guatemalan government in March 2010 calling for the suspension of mining activities taking place on Mayan land, including Goldcorp’s Marlin mine. Both the International Labor Organization and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requested that the Guatemalan government suspend activities at the mine to enable an investigation of alleged violations of international law and independent evaluations of environmental damage. After initially agreeing, the Guatemalan government instead allowed Goldcorp to maintain activities while undertaking its own evaluations that found the Marlin mine to be operating within internationally accepted standards (MICLA 2016).

Yet, civil society groups are increasingly employing discourses and practices aimed at leveraging Goldcorp’s corporate citizenship. The detachment of most Goldcorp executives, who are located in head offices in Canada and the US, from the mining sites challenges the capacity of activists to hold them accountable for harms done to local communities. This is compounded by the lack of appropriate mechanisms through which affected communities can make claims against Goldcorp in Canada. The Government of Canada responded to growing civil society concern over the operations of Canadian mining companies abroad by creating the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor and introduced a Corporate Social Responsibility Code for the Extractive Industry in 2009. Yet both mechanisms are largely ineffective as they lack enforcement mechanisms and depend largely on the voluntary participation of mining companies.

Community activists have therefore sought to evoke Goldcorp’s Canadian citizenship in protest strategies to gain greater access to, and place pressure on, corporate decision makers, state actors, and international organizations. In 2009 a Guatemalan NGO, Frente de Defense San Miguelense (FREDEMI) assisted by the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL), an NGO based in the United States filed a request for review with the Canadian National Contact Point of the OECD to challenge Goldcorp’s operations related to its Marlin mine. The National Contact Point is an interdepartmental committee seated within the federal government that is responsible for implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. FREDEMI and CIEL requested a full investigation of Goldcorp’s human rights abuses in and around the Marlin mine, specifically referencing Paragraph 2 of the General Policies which states that enterprises should “respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments.” Canadian officials however responded by offering to facilitate dialogue between the parties and recommended greater communication between the company and NGO (Global Affairs 2011). This solution was particularly unsatisfactory for NGO activists and served to highlight the ineffectiveness of existing legal frameworks.

Activists have therefore sought stronger international audiences. Members of affected communities brought the San Martin and Marline mine cases before the Permanent People’s Tribunal (PPT) held in Montreal in June 2014. The PPT is a coalition of civil society organizations that examines cases of human rights violations where national and international justice systems have been found ineffective in securing human rights. The PPT jury (2014) held that Goldcorp violated community members’ rights to health, quality of life, the quality of the
environment, and the right to self-determination of affected indigenous groups in Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras. It also held the Canadian state as responsible for human rights violations by act and omission:

In the case of the Canadian state, it is responsible through its actions when it stimulates the presence of Canadian mining companies in other countries through political, economic, financial and diplomatic support; when it tolerates or covers up human rights violations that companies are perpetuating; or when it denies access to effective mechanisms to protect victims of these violations. The Canadian state is responsible by omission when it abstains from adopting measures, or from requiring that Canadian mining companies undertake measures to prevent or remedy human rights violations.

Peruvian and Honduran NGOs, joined by US–based Development and Peace also participated in a public hearing on human rights, mining companies and home-states during the 2013 Session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and highlighted the Canadian government’s complicity in the human rights abuses of mining companies. The Working Group on Mining and Human Rights in Latin America, a network of Latin American civil society groups and NGOs, developed a report for submission to the Commission that examined the impact of Canadian mining in Latin America and the Canadian state’s responsibilities. In the report, the Working Group called on the Canadian government to establish mechanisms through which affected communities can hold Canadian mining companies responsible, arguing that

The lack of effective judicial remedies in host states should be adequately counterbalanced in Canada, the mining companies’ state of origin. Canada should have laws that require companies to answer for the harm caused by their actions abroad, as well as policy to prevent violations from happening. These requirements are fully consistent with international law standards on the responsibility of states of origin for the actions of transnational corporations.

The success of these initiatives depended heavily on the monitoring and prior activism of affected community members living in or near mining sites. These demonstrations garnered the attention of transnational activist networks and Western NGOs that facilitated these opportunities.

The cumulative impact of these collective actions has begun to garner attention from mainstream media in Canada and Goldcorp shareholders. In 2012, Goldcorp closed the open-pit operations of the Marline mine while retaining its underground mine. In April 2012, Goldcorp shareholders expressed concern that the company’s closure plans and funding were both inadequate to contain further damages to surrounding communities. As such, they filed a resolution with Goldcorp asking the company to commit to the full costs of closure of the Marline mine and to make public its closure plans in a rare example of shareholder activism. The Government of Canada has also been under increasing domestic pressure to re-evaluate its pro-mining policies and in 2014 released an enhanced CSR strategy, which commits to enhancing CSR training for diplomats and staff abroad, strengthening the Counsellor’s mandate to help
educate companies on CSR practices, and suggests that any dispute will be referred to the National Contact Point for the OECD (Global Affairs Canada, 2014).

The Canadian state border has therefore featured in protest strategies in important ways and has been increasingly used as a tool for the exertion of collective power in the absence of strong institutional power in host countries. In some stances, community activists have contested Goldcorp’s identification as a Canadian corporation (and foreign investor) by drawing attention to the intimate interconnections and interdependencies between its mining operations and local communities and the environment. This is while other groups adopted discourses that buttressed Goldcorp’s claimed corporate citizenship as a means of accessing greater opportunities to hold the company accountable. This demonstrates that state borders, when employed by global corporations to govern production network, are also sites of contestation with significantly different meanings for groups inside and outside of production processes.

Conclusion

In evoking images and understandings of Canadian citizenship in its discourse and practices, Goldcorp transposes the Canadian border while expanding the frontiers of the Canadian state’s regulatory powers. This is reinforced by the interventions conducted by Canadian state officials on behalf of the company in host-markets as well as the financial support given by state agencies to aid the company’s expansion abroad. Evoking the Canadian border is therefore an important part of Goldcorp’s capacity to govern its global production networks and its relations with host-states and communities. At the same time, adopting a Canadian identity serves to hide its very diverse global network behind a single cloak. Future research should examine the fluidity of Goldcorp’s corporation nationality, namely the role its subsidiaries play in granting Goldcorp multiple citizenships, how this different citizenships are employed and the different privileges it grants Goldcorp’s global network and investors. Goldcorp’s conjuring of the Canadian border, however, has not been in the absence of contestation. Rather, civil society groups have sought to dissolve the barriers Goldcorp erects between its operations and local communities by raising awareness of their interdependencies and interconnections. Faced with the lack of responsiveness by both state actors and corporate officials, civil society actors have increasingly employed border-producing practices and discourses to reinforce the company’s corporate nationality as a means to hold Goldcorp accountable and the Canadian state responsible for its complicity. This reaffirms the constructivist view of borders as sites of social contestation and multiple meanings. It also raises the need to take borders more seriously in studies of global production processes, with the understanding that state borders are not territorially fixed, but fluid and transposable. Future research should acknowledge such processes not as erasing state borders but as depending upon their reproduction.
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